The Present and Future of Game Theory
AbstractA broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given serve only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written. The purpose here is to present a broad brush picture of the many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship between good theory and practice. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of conflict, coordination and cooperation and the abstract investigation of all of them.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000173.
Date of creation: 31 Jul 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-08-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2011-08-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-08-09 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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