Three Minimal Market Institutions with Human and Algorithmic Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Abstract
We define and examine the performance of three minimal strategic market games (sell-all, buy-sell, and double auction) in laboratory relative to the predictions of theory. Unlike open or partial equilibrium settings of most other experiments, these closed exchange economies have limited amounts of cash to facilitate transactions, and include feedback. General equilibrium theory, since it abstracts away from market mechanisms and has no role for money or credit, makes no predictions about how the paths of convergence to the competitive equilibrium may differ across alternative mechanisms. Introduction of markets and money as carriers of process creates the possibility of motion. The laboratory data reveal different paths, and different levels of allocative efficiency in the three settings. The results suggest that abstracting away from all institutional details does not help understand dynamic aspects of market behavior. For example, the oligopoly effect of feedback from buying an endowed good is missed. Inclusion of mechanism differences into theory may enhance our understanding of important aspects of markets and money and help link conventional equilibrium analysis with dynamics.Download Info
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Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1623.Length: 56 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision: Jun 2009
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2010), 70: 403-424
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1623
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Phone: (203) 432-3702
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Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Related research
Keywords: Strategic market games; Laboratory experiments; Minimally intelligent agents; Adaptive learning agents; General equilibrium;Other versions of this item:
- Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam, 2010. "Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 403-424, November.
- Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2007. "Three Minimal Market Institutions with Human and Algorithmic Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1623R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2010.
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2007-09-09 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-09-09 (Game Theory)
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2009.
"The Value of Fiat Money with an Outside Bank: An Experimental Game,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
814577000000000145, David K. Levine.
- Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2008. "The Value of Fiat Money with an Outside Bank: An Experimental Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1675, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2010.
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