AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 46 (1978)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam, 2007. "Three Minimal Market Institutions: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 27, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Pradeep Dubey & Martin Shubik, 1979. "A Strategic Market Game with Price and Quantity Strategies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 521, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1997.
"General Equilibrium Concepts under Imperfect Competition: A Cournotian Approach,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 199-230, March.
- D'ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS, R. & GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1992. "General equilibrium concepts under imperfect competition: a Cournotion approach," CORE Discussion Papers 1992057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- d'ASPREMONT, C. & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, R. & ÉRARD-VARET, L.-A., . "General equilibrium concepts under imperfect competition: a Cournotian approach," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1259, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- D'Aspremont, C. & Dos Santos Ferreira, R. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1992. "General Equilibrium Concepts Under Imperfect Competition: A Cournotien Approach," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 92a03, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Jose M. Cordoba & Peter J. Hammond, 1998.
"Asymptotically Strategy-Proof Walrasian Exchange,"
98005, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam, 2010.
"Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: Theory and experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 403-424, November.
- Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2007. "Three Minimal Market Institutions with Human and Algorithmic Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1623, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2009.
- Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2007. "Three Minimal Market Institutions with Human and Algorithmic Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1623R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2010.
- Roberto Serrano, 2004.
"Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003,"
2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.