But Who Will Guard the Guardians?
AbstractA pre-recorded version of Leonid Hurwicz' Prize Lecture was presented on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. The lecture was introduced by Professor Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Nobel Prize Committee in its series Nobel Prize in Economics documents with number 2007-3.
Length: 1 pages
Date of creation: 08 Dec 2007
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Web page: http://www.nobelprize.org
Other versions of this item:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-05-05 (Business Economics)
- NEP-HIS-2008-05-05 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-HPE-2008-05-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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