Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eric S. Maskin

Abstract

Eric S. Maskin delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.3.567
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 98 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 567-76

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:567-76

Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.567
Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Hammond, Peter J, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 263-82, April.
  4. Sandeep Baliga & Eric Maskin, 2003. "Mechanism Design for the Environment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000341, David K. Levine.
  5. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
  6. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
  7. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  8. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques M, 1985. "On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 1-29, January.
  10. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 49-67.
  11. Jordan, J. S., 1982. "The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, October.
  12. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
  13. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-51, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Johann K. Brunner, 2010. "Rationalität und Effizienz - einige Lehren aus der Verhaltensökonomik für die Wohlfahrtstheorie," NRN working papers 2010-16, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  2. Martin Shubik, 2011. "The Present and Future of Game Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1808, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Major, Iván, 2014. "Ha elfogy a bizalom... Kialakítható-e optimális mechanizmus kétoldalú aszimmetrikus információ esetén?
    [When confidence evaporates&. Does optimal mechanism design exist under doubly asymmet
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 148-165.
  4. Cato, Susumu, 2012. "A note on the extension of a binary relation on a set to the power set," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 46-48.
  5. Powell, Andrew & Maier, Antonia & Miller, Marcus, 2012. "Prudent Banks and Creative Mimics: Can we tell the difference?," CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) 76, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  6. Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke, 2012. "Market design in Chinese market places," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 525-546, September.
  7. Mercado, Ruben, 2013. "Development indices, inequality, and applied development policy analysis: some issues for discussion," MPRA Paper 58018, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Smith, Eric & Shubik, Martin, 2011. "Endogenizing the provision of money: Costs of commodity and fiat monies in relation to the value of trade," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 508-530.
  9. Kornai, János, 2013. "Bevezetés a Központosítás és piaci reform című kötethez
    [Introduction to the volume Centralization and Market Reform]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 253-281.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:567-76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.