Transparency, Efficiency and the Distribution of Economic Welfare in Pass-Through Investment Trust Games
AbstractWe design an experiment to examine welfare and behavior in a multi-level trust game representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market. In a repeated game, an Investor invests via an Intermediary who lends to a Borrower. A pre-experiment one-shot version of the game serves as a baseline and to type each subject. We alter the transparency of exchanges between non-adjacent parties. We find transparency of the exchanges between the investor and intermediary does not significantly affect welfare. However, transparency regarding exchanges between the intermediary and borrower promotes trust on the part of the investor, increasing welfare. Further, this has asymmetric effects: borrowers and intermediaries achieve greater welfare benefits than investors. We discuss implications for what specific aspects of financial market transparency may facilitate more efficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Chapman University, Economic Science Institute in its series Working Papers with number 11-03.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
financial intermediation; financial market transparency; pass through securities; multi-level trust games; experiments;
Other versions of this item:
- Rietz, Thomas A. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W. & Smith, Vernon L., 2013. "Transparency, efficiency and the distribution of economic welfare in pass-through investment trust games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 257-267.
- Rietz, Thomas & Sheremeta, Roman & Shields, Timothy & Smith, Vernon, 2013. "Transparency, Efficiency and the Distribution of Economic Welfare in Pass-Through Investment Trust Games," MPRA Paper 53594, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-06-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-06-04 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-06-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-06-04 (Game Theory)
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