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Forced Information Disclosure and the Fallacy of Transparency in Markets

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Author Info
Timothy N. Cason
Charles R. Plott

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Abstract

A theory advanced in regulatory hearings holds that market performance will be improved if one side of the market is forced to publicly reveal preferences. For example, wholesale electricity producers claim that retail electricity consumers would pay lower prices if wholesale public utility demand is disclosed to producers. Experimental markets studied here featured decentralized, privately negotiated contracts, typical of the wholesale electricity markets. Two conclusions emerge: (1) such markets generally converge to the competitive equilibrium and (2) forced disclosure works to the disadvantage of the disclosing side. Information disclosure would result in higher wholesale and thus higher retail electricity prices. (JEL L50, L94, D43) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbi049
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 699-714
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:699-714

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1984. "The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(4), pages 479-507, October.
  2. Sanford J. Grossman & Motty Perry, 1986. "Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information," NBER Technical Working Papers 0056, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Plott, Charles R & Sunder, Shyam, 1988. "Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1085-1118, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Smith, Vernon L. & Williams, Arlington W., 1982. "The effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 99-116, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Plott, Charles R & Smith, Vernon L, 1978. "An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange Institutions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(1), pages 133-53, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith, 1982. "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1123-42, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Forsythe, Robert & Lundholm, Russell, 1990. "Information Aggregation in an Experimental Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 309-47, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. C. Duke & L. Gangadharan, 2005. "Salinity in Water Markets: An ExperimentalInvestigation of the Sunraysia Salinity Levy, Victoria," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 950, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
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