Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

All-pay-all Aspects of Political Decision Making

Contents:

Author Info

  • Thomas Giebe
  • Paul Schweinzer

Abstract

We study decision making processes with non-standard all-pay structures. We motivate this interest through a group of regulatory, political, legal, military, and economic applications where individual actions determine the consequences for a larger group or the public. The common features of these examples are a competitive environment, winner-take-all reward structure, and some form of all-pay-all payment rule.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2013/wp-cesifo-2013-07/cesifo1_wp4330.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4330.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4330

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Email:
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: auctions; contests; regulation; conflict;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
  2. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9409002, EconWPA.
  3. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2013. "The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich 118, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  5. Todd Kaplan, 2001. "All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards," Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics 0109, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  6. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier.
  7. Lizzeri, Alessandro & Persico, Nicola, 2000. "Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 83-114, January.
  8. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  9. Gadi Fibich & Arieh Gavious & Aner Sela, 2006. "All-pay auctions with risk-averse players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 583-599, November.
  10. Parreiras, Sérgio O. & Rubinchik, Anna, 2010. "Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 703-715, March.
  11. Hopkins Ed & Kornienko Tatiana, 2007. "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, May.
  12. Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
  13. Luis Corchón, 2007. "The theory of contests: a survey," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4330. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.