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Auctions with Financial Externalities

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Author Info
Emiel Maasland ()
Sander Onderstal ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-006-0119-1
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 32 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 551-574
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:32:y:2007:i:3:p:551-574

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Related research
Keywords: Auctions; Financial externalities; Reserve price; C72; D44;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sudipto Dasgupta & Kevin Tsui, 2004. "Auctions with cross-shareholdings," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 163-194, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. repec:att:wimass:19199933 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Maasland, E. & Onderstal, S., 2002. "Optimal auctions with financial externalities," Discussion Paper 21, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. de Frutos, M. Angeles, 2000. "Asymmetric Price-Benefits Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 48-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance 9903005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2000. "Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 768-791, Winter.
    Other versions:
  8. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Van Damme, E., 1990. "Fair Division Under Asymmetric Information," Papers 9070, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  10. Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
  11. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1996. "Strategic Nonparticipation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 84-98, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. William S. Comanor & Mark A. Schankerman, 1976. "Identical Bids and Cartel Behavior," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 281-286, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-39, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Ettinger, David, 2003. "Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 1-7, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 2001. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(1), pages 155-79, January.
  17. Maasland, E. & Onderstal, S., 2002. "Auctions with financial externalities," Discussion Paper 22, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Börgers, Tilman & Dustmann, Christian, 2001. "Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction," CEPR Discussion Papers 3072, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  20. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 258-293, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lu, Jingfeng, 2006. "When and how to dismantle nuclear weapons," MPRA Paper 935, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lu, Jingfeng, 2006. "Unifying Identity-Specific and Financial Externalities in Auction Design
    [When and How to Dismantle Nuclear Weapons: Auction Design with Externalities]    ," MPRA Paper 6484, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2007. [Downloadable!]
  3. Börgers, Tilman & Dustmann, Christian, 2001. "Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction," CEPR Discussion Papers 3072, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Maasland, E. & Onderstal, S., 2002. "Optimal auctions with financial externalities," Discussion Paper 21, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2007. "Auctions with Financial Externalities," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 551-574, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2006. "Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 197-249, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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