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Bulls, Bears and Excess Volatility: can currency intervention help?

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Author Info
Corrado, L.
Miller, M.
Zhang, L.

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Abstract

Asset mis-pricing may reflect investor psychology, with excess volatility arising from switches of sentiment. For a floating exchange rate where fundamentals follow a random walk, we show that excess volatility can be generated by the repeated entry and exit of currency `bulls' and `bears' with switches driven by `draw-down' trading rules. We argue that non-sterilised intervention - in support of `monitoring band' - can reduce excess volatility by coordinating beliefs in line with policy. Strategic complementarity in the foreign exchange market suggests that sterilised intervention may also play a coordinating role.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0708.

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Length: 29
Date of creation: Jan 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0708

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Related research
Keywords: Monitoring Rules; Monitoring Band; Bear and Bull Traders; Excess Volatility; Central Bank Intervention.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(1), pages 87-113, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Richard Portes & Hélène Rey, 1998. "The emergence of the euro as an international currency," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 305-343, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features," CEPR Discussion Papers 1315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Williamson, John, 1998. "Crawling Bands or Monitoring Bands: How to Manage Exchange Rates in a World of Capital Mobility," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 59-79, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2006. "Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 452-484, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Corrado, L. & Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, 2002. "Exchange Rate Monitoring Bands: Theory and Policy," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0209, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-44, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, 2002. "A Survey of Behavioral Finance," NBER Working Papers 9222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Krugman, Paul & Miller, Marcus, 1993. "Why have a target zone?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 279-314, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Coordination and Policy Traps," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000294, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Lucio Sarno & Mark P. Taylor, 2001. "Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective and, If So, How Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 839-868, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Paul De Grauwe & Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser, 2007. "Modeling Optimism and Pessimism in the Foreign Exchange Market," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Prat, Andrea & Dasgupta, Amil, 2006. "Financial equilibrium with career concerns," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 67-93, March. [Downloadable!]
  17. Dasgupta, Amil & Prat, Andrea, 2005. "Asset Price Dynamics When Traders Care About Reputation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5372, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michael Melvin & Lukas Menkhoff & Maik Schmeling, 2008. "Automating Exchange Rate Target Zones: Intervention via an Electronic Limit Order Book," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Paul De Grauwe & Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser, 2007. "Modeling Optimism and Pessimism in the Foreign Exchange Market," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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