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Financial equilibrium with career concerns

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Author Info

  • Prat, Andrea

    ()
    (LSE)

  • Dasgupta, Amil

    ()
    (LSE)

Abstract

What are the equilibrium features of a financial market where a sizeable proportion of traders face reputational concerns? This question is central to our understanding of financial markets, which are increasingly dominated by institutional investors. We construct a model of delegated portfolio management that captures key features of the US mutual fund industry and embed it in an asset pricing framework. We thus provide a formal model of financial equilibrium with career concerned agents. Fund managers differ in their ability to understand market fundamentals, and in every period investors choose a fund. In equilibrium, the presence of career concerns induces uninformed fund managers to churn , i.e., to engage in trading even when they face a negative expected return. Churners act as noise traders and enhance the level of trading volume. The equilibrium relationship between fund return and net fund flows displays a skewed shape that is consistent with stylized facts. The robustness of our core results is probed from several angles.

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File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20060067/447/11
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 1 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 67-93

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Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:165

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Web page: http://econtheory.org

Related research

Keywords: Career concerns; financial equilibrium; trade volume;

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Cited by:
  1. Dimitrios P Tsomocos & Sudipto Bhattacharya, 2006. "Banks, Relative Performance, and Sequential Contagion," Economics Series Working Papers 2006-FE-10, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Veronica Guerrieri & Péter Kondor, 2009. "Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility," NBER Working Papers 14898, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Citci, Haluk & Inci, Eren, 2012. "The Masquerade Ball of the CEOs and the Mask of Excessive Risk," MPRA Paper 35979, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Steven Malliaris & Hongjun Yan, 2008. "Nickels versus Black Swans: Reputation, Trading Strategies and Asset Prices," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2380, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Mar 2009.
  5. Gregory DeCoster & William Strange, 2012. "Developers, Herding, and Overbuilding," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 7-35, January.
  6. Dasgupta, Amil & Prat, Andrea & Verardo, Michela, 2007. "Institutional Trade Persistence and Long-Term Equity Returns," CEPR Discussion Papers 6374, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Xiangbo Liu & Zijun Liu & Zhigang Qiu, 2013. "Stock Market Manipulation in the Presence of Fund Flows," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 483-491, November.
  8. Rudiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien, 2013. "Financial Experts, Asset Prices and Reputation," MPRA Paper 51784, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Luisa Corrado & Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, 2007. "Bulls, bears and excess volatility: can currency intervention help?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 261-272.
  10. Yolanda Portilla, 2009. "Two-sided career concern and financial equilibrium," Economics Working Papers we091207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  11. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Charles Goodhart & Dimitrios Tsomocos & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2011. "Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis and the Leverage Cycle," FMG Special Papers sp202, Financial Markets Group.

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