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Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments

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  • de Gorter, Harry
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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48638
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    Paper provided by World Bank in its series Agricultural Distortions Working Paper with number 48638.

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    Date of creation: Aug 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:ags:wbadwp:48638

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    Related research

    Keywords: Distorted incentives; agricultural and trade policy reforms; national agricultural development; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18;

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    1. Beghin, John C. & Karp, L., 1991. "Estimation of Price Policies in Senegal: An Empirical Test of Cooperative Game Theory," Staff General Research Papers 1570, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Beard, Nick & Swinbank, Alan, 2001. "Decoupled payments to facilitate CAP reform," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 121-145, April.
    3. Bullock, David S, 1995. "Are Government Transfers Efficient? An Alternative Test of the Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1236-74, December.
    4. Alesina, Alberto F & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 565, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-63, February.
    6. Anderson, Kym, 1993. "Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
    8. Lawrence H. Goulder & Roberton C. Williams III, 2003. "The Substantial Bias from Ignoring General Equilibrium Effects in Estimating Excess Burden, and a Practical Solution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(4), pages 898-927, August.
    9. Ruben Segura-Cayuela, 2006. "Inefficient Policies, Inefficient Institutions and Trade," 2006 Meeting Papers 502, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Becker, Gary S & Mulligan, Casey B, 2003. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 293-340, October.
    11. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 267-93, March.
    12. Swinnen, Johan F.M. & de Gorter, Harry, 1995. "Endogenous Commodity Policies and the Social Benefits from Public Research Expenditures," Working Papers 128002, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    13. Joe Dewbre & Jes�s Ant�n & Wyatt Thompton, 2001. "The Transfer Efficiency and Trade Effects of Direct Payments," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1204-1214.
    14. Patterson, Lee Ann, 1997. "Agricultural policy reform in the European Community: a three-level game analysis," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(01), pages 135-165, December.
    15. de Bovenberg, A Lans & Mooij, Ruud A, 1994. "Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 1085-89, September.
    16. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
    17. William E. Foster & Gordon C. Rausser, 1992. "Price-Distorting Compensation Serving the Consumer and Taxpayer Interest," Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications 90-gatt15, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State University.
    18. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    19. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    20. Johan F. M. Swinnen & Harry Gorter, 1993. "Why Small Groups And Low Income Sectors Obtain Subsidies: The "Altruistic" Side Of A "Self-Interested" Government," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 285-293, November.
    21. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March.
    22. Kathy Baylis & Gordon Rausser, 2001. "Rules, Policy and Rent Seeking: A Cross-border Comparison," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 49(4), pages 493-504, December.
    23. Kishore Gawande, 1999. "Trade Barriers as Outcomes from Two-Stage Games: Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1028-1056, August.
    24. Parry, Ian, 1997. "Agricultural Policies in the Presence of Distorting Taxes," Discussion Papers dp-98-05, Resources For the Future.
    25. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
    26. Blandford, David & de Gorter, Harry & Harvey, David, 1989. "Farm income support with minimal trade distortions," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 268-273, August.
    27. Paarlberg, Robert, 1997. "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(03), pages 413-444, June.
    28. Browning, Edgar K., 1997. "A neglected welfare cost of monopoly--and most other product market distortions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 127-144, October.
    29. H. Guyomard & L. P. Mahé & K. J. Munk & T. L. Roe, 1993. "Agriculture In The Uruguay Round: Ambitions And Realities," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 245-263.
    30. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    31. Avinash K. Dixit, 1998. "The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262540983, December.
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