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Are Government Transfers Efficient? An Alternative Test of the Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis

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  • Bullock, David S

Abstract

The efficient redistribution hypothesis says that no available government policies are Pareto superior to observed government policies. Efficient redistribution from government policy is a central tenet of much recent theoretical and applied political economy literature. In this paper, limitations of previous attempts to test the efficient redistribution hypothesis are discussed and an alternative test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis that uses vector optimization theory and bootstrap methodology is presented. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

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  • Bullock, David S, 1995. "Are Government Transfers Efficient? An Alternative Test of the Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1236-1274, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:103:y:1995:i:6:p:1236-74
    DOI: 10.1086/601450
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    Cited by:

    1. Mittenzwei, Klaus & Bullock, David S. & Salhofer, Klaus, 2012. "Towards a theory of policy timing," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 56(4), pages 1-14.
    2. de Gorter, Harry, 2008. "Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 48638, World Bank.
    3. Coate, Stephen, 2000. "An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 437-455, April.
    4. Eckardt, Martina, 2004. "Evolutionary approaches to legal change," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 47, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    5. Sahrbacher, Amanda, 2012. "Impacts of CAP reforms on farm structures and performance disparities: An agent-based approach," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 65, number 65.
    6. Glaeser, Edward L. & Ponzetto, Giacomo A.M., 2014. "Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 89-105.
    7. Bullock David S. & Couleau Anabelle, 2014. "Policy Analysis in Welfare and Policy Spaces: Applications to the Labyrinthine U.S. Ethanol Policy Literature," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-17, January.
    8. Bullock, David S. & Salhofer, Klaus, 2003. "Judging agricultural policies: a survey," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 225-243, May.
    9. Fertő, Imre, 1998. "Az agrárpolitika politikai gazdaságtana I. A kormányzati politikák modellezése a mezőgazdaságban [The political economy of agrarian politics. Part I. Modeling of governmental policies in agricultur," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 223-246.
    10. D.S. Bullock & K. Salhofer, 1998. "Measuring the social costs of suboptimal combinations of policy instruments: A general framework and an example," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 18(3), pages 249-259, May.
    11. Marcos Rangel & Duncan Thomas, 2019. "Decision-Making in Complex Households," NBER Working Papers 26511, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Earl L. Grinols & Peri Silva, 2012. "Intervention Efficiency, Incentive Symmetry, and Information," Development Working Papers 334, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 16 Jul 2012.
    13. Agathe Rouaix & Charles Figuières & Marc Willinger, 2015. "The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(3), pages 601-623, October.
    14. Alston, Julian M. & Smith, Vincent H. & Acquaye, Albert & Hosseini, Safdar, 1999. "Least-cost cheap-food policies: some implications of international food aid," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 191-201, May.
    15. Ando, Amy Whritenour, 1998. "Do Interest Groups Compete?," Discussion Papers 10732, Resources for the Future.
    16. James, Jennifer S., 1999. "Quality Responses to Agricultural Policies," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 271488, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    17. Thomas, Duncan & Rangel, Marcos, 2020. "Decision-Making in Complex Households," CEPR Discussion Papers 14278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Jonathan Brooks, 1996. "Agricultural Policies In Oecd Countries: What Can We Learn From Political Economy Models?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1‐4), pages 366-389, January.
    19. Salhofer, K., 1996. "Efficient income redistribution for a small country using optimal combined instruments," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 191-199, February.
    20. Mittenzwei, Klaus & Bullock, David S. & Salhofer, Klaus & Kola, Jukka, 2011. "Towards a Theory of Policy Making," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 114639, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    21. Marcos A. Rangel & Duncan Thomas, 2019. "Decision-Making in Complex Households," Working Papers 2019-070, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    22. David S. Bullock & Klaus Salhofer & Jukka Kola, 1999. "The Normative Analysis of Agricultural Policy: A General Framework and Review," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 512-535, September.
    23. Thilo Glebe & Klaus Salhofer, 2007. "EU agri‐environmental programs and the “restaurant table effect”," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 37(2‐3), pages 211-218, September.
    24. Weinberg, Joe, 2018. "Where’s the Pork?: The Political Economy of the US Farm Bill," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 273867, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    25. Bullock, David S., 2008. "Simulating the Effects of Supply and Demand Elasticities on Political-Economic Equilibrium," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 48636, World Bank.

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