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Educational Homogamy: Preferences or Opportunities?

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  • Michael Svarer
  • Helena Skyt Nielsen

    ()
    (School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus, Denmark)

Abstract

Individuals match on length and type of education. We investigate whether the systematic relationship between educations of partners is explained by opportuni- ties (e.g. low search frictions) or preferences (e.g. complementarities in household production or portfolio optimization). We find that half of the systematic sorting on education is due to low search frictions in marriage markets of the educational institutions. The other half is attributed to complementarities in household pro- duction, since income properties of the joint income process show no influence on partner selection.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2006-10.

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Length: 33
Date of creation: 16 Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2006-10

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Web page: http://www.econ.au.dk/afn/

Related research

Keywords: positive assortative matching on education; search frictions; hedging; complementarities in household production;

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References

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  1. Lisa Jepsen & Christopher Jepsen, 2002. "An empirical analysis of the matching patterns of same-sex and opposite-sex couples," Demography, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 435-453, August.
  2. Gautier, Pieter A & Svarer, Michael & Teulings, Coen N, 2005. "Marriage and the City," CEPR Discussion Papers 4939, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Michael Svarer, 2004. "Is Your Love in Vain? Another Look at Premarital Cohabitation and Divorce," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 39(2).
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  5. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2006. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," IZA Discussion Papers 2454, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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  7. Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-87, December.
  8. Gregory D. Hess, 2001. "Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What’s Love Got to do With It?," CESifo Working Paper Series 507, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Steven Stern & Michael J. Brien & Lee A. Lillard, 1999. "Cohabitation, Marriage, and Divorce in a Model of Match Quality," Virginia Economics Online Papers 322, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  10. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Melvin Stephens Jr., 2001. "Job Displacement, Disability, and Divorce," NBER Working Papers 8578, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Raymond Fisman & Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica & Itamar Simonson, 2006. "Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence from a Speed Dating Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(2), pages 673-697, May.
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Cited by:
  1. repec:ese:iserwp:2008-32 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Raaum, Oddbjørn & Bratsberg, Bernt & Røed, Knut & Österbacka , Eva & Eriksson, Tor & Jäntti, Markus & Naylor, Robin, 2007. "Marital Sorting, Household Labor Supply, and Intergenerational Earnings Mobility across Countries," Memorandum 17/2007, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  3. Helena Skyt Nielsen & Nina Smith & Aycan Celikaksoy, 2007. "The Effect of Marriage on Education of Immigrants: Evidence from a Policy Reform Restricting Spouse Import," Economics Working Papers 2007-07, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.

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