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Asymmetric Shocks in a Currency Union with Monetary and Fiscal Handcuffs

In: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2010

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  • Christopher J. Erceg
  • Jesper Lindé

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of the asymmetric shocks within a currency union in a framework that takes account of the zero bound constraint on policy rates, and also allows for constraints on fiscal policy. In this environment, we document that the usual optimal currency argument showing that the effects of shocks are mitigated to the extent that they are common across member states can be reversed. Countries can be worse off when their neighbors experience similar shocks, including policy-driven reductions in government spending.

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This chapter was published in:

  • Richard Clarida & Francesco Giavazzi, 2011. "NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2010," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number clar10-1, octubre-d.
    This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 12213.

    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12213

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    1. Lawrence Christiano & Roberto Motto & Massimo Rostagno, 2007. "Shocks, Structures or Monetary Policies? The Euro Area and US After 2001," NBER Working Papers 13521, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Betts, Caroline & Devereux, Michael B., 1996. "The exchange rate in a model of pricing-to-market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1007-1021, April.
    3. Cogan, John F. & Cwik, Tobias J. & Taylor, John B. & Wieland, Volker, 2009. "New Keynesian versus old Keynesian government spending multipliers," CFS Working Paper Series 2009/17, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    4. Lawrence J. Christiano & Mathias Trabandt & Karl Walentin, 2010. "Introducing financial frictions and unemployment into a small open economy model," CQER Working Paper 2010-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    5. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    6. Klaus Adam & Roberto M. Billi, 2007. "Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy," Research Working Paper RWP 07-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    7. Christopher J. Erceg & Luca Guerrieri & Christopher Gust, 2006. "SIGMA: a new open economy model for policy analysis," International Finance Discussion Papers 835, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2011. "What Fiscal Policy is Effective at Zero Interest Rates?," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Volume 25, pages 59-112 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2005. "Great expectations and the end of the depression," Staff Reports 234, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    10. Davig, Troy & Leeper, Eric M., 2011. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 211-227, February.
    11. David Domeij & Martin Floden, 2006. "The Labor-Supply Elasticity and Borrowing Constraints: Why Estimates are Biased," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 242-262, April.
    12. Bernanke, Ben S. & Gertler, Mark & Gilchrist, Simon, 1999. "The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1341-1393 Elsevier.
    13. Malin Adolfson & Stefan Laséen & Jesper Lindé & Mattias Villani, 2005. "The Role of Sticky Prices in an Open Economy DSGE Model: A Bayesian Investigation," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 444-457, 04/05.
    14. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kahn, Charles M, 1980. "The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(5), pages 1305-11, July.
    15. Bodenstein, Martin & Erceg, Christopher & Guerrieri, Luca, 2010. "The Effects of Foreign Shocks When Interest Rates Are at Zero," CEPR Discussion Papers 8006, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Anderson, Gary & Moore, George, 1985. "A linear algebraic procedure for solving linear perfect foresight models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-252.
    17. Thomas Laubach, 2010. "Fiscal Policy and Interest Rates: The Role of Sovereign Default Risk," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2010, pages 7-29 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Yun, Tack, 1996. "Nominal price rigidity, money supply endogeneity, and business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 345-370, April.
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    Cited by:
    1. Javier Andrés & J.E. Boscá & Javier Ferri, 2014. "Instruments, rules and household debt: the effects of fiscal policy," Working Papers 1401, International Economics Institute, University of Valencia.
    2. Erceg, Christopher & Lindé, Jesper, 2012. "Fiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts vs. Tax Hikes," CEPR Discussion Papers 9155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Ippei Fujiwara & Kozo Ueda, 2010. "The Fiscal Multiplier and Spillover in a Global Liquidity Trap," IMES Discussion Paper Series 10-E-03, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    4. Soldatos, Gerasimos T., 2014. "A Fiscal-Monetary Policy Scheme Against Greek Indebtedness and Impoverishment," MPRA Paper 57080, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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