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Michael Powell

Personal Details

First Name:Michael
Middle Name:
Last Name:Powell
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppo453
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:2011 Economics Department; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Kellogg Graduate School of Management
Northwestern University

Evanston, Illinois (United States)
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/
RePEc:edi:kgsnwus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Rena M. Conti & Brigham Frandsen & Michael L. Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2021. "Common Agent or Double Agent? Pharmacy Benefit Managers in the Prescription Drug Market," NBER Working Papers 28866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Nicola Bianchi & Giulia Bovini & Jin Li & Matteo Paradisi & Michael L. Powell, 2021. "Career Spillovers in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 28605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Brigham Frandsen & Michael Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2017. "Sticking Points: Common-Agency Problems and Contracting in the U.S. Healthcare System," NBER Working Papers 23177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2014. "Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation," IZA Discussion Papers 8404, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  5. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms," ECON - Working Papers 171, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2020.
  6. Robert S. Gibbons & Richard T. Holden & Michael L. Powell, 2010. "Rational-Expectations Equilibrium in Intermediate Good Markets," NBER Working Papers 15783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Robert S. Gibbons & Richard T. Holden & Michael L. Powell, 2010. "Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited," NBER Working Papers 15779, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Articles

  1. George Georgiadis & Michael Powell, 2022. "A/B Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(1), pages 267-303, January.
  2. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
  3. Li, Jin & Powell, Michael, 2020. "Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 358-382.
  4. Brigham Frandsen & Michael Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2019. "Sticking points: common‐agency problems and contracting in the US healthcare system," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(2), pages 251-285, June.
  5. Michael Powell, 2019. "Productivity and credibility in industry equilibrium," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(1), pages 121-146, March.
  6. Daniel Barron & Michael Powell, 2019. "Policies in Relational Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 228-249, May.
  7. Rongzhu Ke & Jin Li & Michael Powell, 2018. "Managing Careers in Organizations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 197-252.
  8. Jin Li & Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell, 2017. "Power Dynamics in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 217-241, February.
  9. Michael Powell, 2015. "An Influence-Cost Model of Organizational Practices and Firm Boundaries," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(suppl_1), pages 104-142.
  10. Robert Gibbons & Richard Holden & Michael Powell, 2012. "Organization and Information: Firms' Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1813-1841.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Nicola Bianchi & Giulia Bovini & Jin Li & Matteo Paradisi & Michael L. Powell, 2021. "Career Spillovers in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 28605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Allen, Steven G., 2023. "Demand for older workers: What do we know? What do we need to learn?," The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, Elsevier, vol. 24(C).
    2. Francesco Devicienti & Bernardo Fanfani, 2021. "Firms' Margins of Adjustment to Wage Growth. The Case of Italian Collective Bargaining," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

  2. Brigham Frandsen & Michael Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2017. "Sticking Points: Common-Agency Problems and Contracting in the U.S. Healthcare System," NBER Working Papers 23177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Leila Agha & Keith Marzilli Ericson & Xiaoxi Zhao, 2020. "The Impact of Organizational Boundaries on Healthcare Coordination and Utilization," NBER Working Papers 28179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert Town, 2014. "The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 19800, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Michael L. Barnett & Andrew Olenski & Adam Sacarny, 2023. "Common Practice: Spillovers from Medicare on Private Health Care," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 65-88, August.
    4. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Yunan Ji & Neale Mahoney, 2020. "Randomized trial shows healthcare payment reform has equal-sized spillover effects on patients not targeted by reform," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 117(32), pages 18939-18947, August.
    5. Leila Agha & Brigham Frandsen & James B. Rebitzer, 2017. "Fragmented Division of Labor and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Moves Across Regions," NBER Working Papers 23078, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-05, McMaster University.
    7. Luke B. Connelly & Gianluca Fiorentini, 2021. "Structural factors and integrated care interventions: is there a role for economists in the policy debate?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 22(8), pages 1141-1150, November.

  3. Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2014. "Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation," IZA Discussion Papers 8404, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    Cited by:

    1. Mathias Erlei & Wiebke Roß, 2013. "Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem," TUC Working Papers in Economics 0009, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
    2. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yoshitaka Okano & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2015. "The approval mechanism solves the prisoner's dilemma theoretically and experimentally," Working Papers SDES-2015-12, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2018. "Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 65-77, June.
    5. Aghion, Philippe & Fehr, Ernst & Holden, Richard & Wilkening, Tom, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 8971, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, "undated". "Approval Mechanism to Solve Prisoner’s Dilemma: Comparison with Varian’s Compensation Mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2016-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management.

  4. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms," ECON - Working Papers 171, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2020.

    Cited by:

    1. Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism design and intentions," ECON - Working Papers 066, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2014.
    2. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele & Ogawa, Kazuhito, 2021. "Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 366-389.
    3. Mathias Erlei & Wiebke Roß, 2013. "Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem," TUC Working Papers in Economics 0009, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
    4. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yoshitaka Okano & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2015. "The approval mechanism solves the prisoner's dilemma theoretically and experimentally," Working Papers SDES-2015-12, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2018. "Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 65-77, June.
    7. Aghion, Philippe & Fehr, Ernst & Holden, Richard & Wilkening, Tom, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 8971, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. David Frydlinger & Oliver D. Hart, 2019. "Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles," NBER Working Papers 26245, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, "undated". "Approval Mechanism to Solve Prisoner’s Dilemma: Comparison with Varian’s Compensation Mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2016-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms," ECON - Working Papers 171, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2020.
    11. Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2019. "Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments," NBER Working Papers 25918, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Fahn, Matthias & MacLeod, W. Bentley & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2023. "Past and Future Developments in the Economics of Relational Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 16427, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Federico Echenique & Mat'ias N'u~nez, 2022. "Price & Choose," Papers 2212.05650, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

  5. Robert S. Gibbons & Richard T. Holden & Michael L. Powell, 2010. "Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited," NBER Working Papers 15779, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Roman Fossati, 2012. "Outsourcing versus Vertical Integration: A Dynamic Model of Industry Equilibrium," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 12/627, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.

Articles

  1. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Li, Jin & Powell, Michael, 2020. "Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 358-382.

    Cited by:

    1. Ricard Gil & Myongjin Kim & Giorgio Zanarone, 2022. "Relationships Under Stress: Relational Outsourcing in the U.S. Airline Industry After the 2008 Financial Crisis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1256-1277, February.

  3. Brigham Frandsen & Michael Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2019. "Sticking points: common‐agency problems and contracting in the US healthcare system," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(2), pages 251-285, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Michael Powell, 2019. "Productivity and credibility in industry equilibrium," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(1), pages 121-146, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Jan Grobovsek, 2016. "Managerial Delegation, Law Enforcement, and Aggregate Productivity," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 271, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    2. Steven Callander & Dana Foarta & Takuo Sugaya, 2022. "Market Competition and Political Influence: An Integrated Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(6), pages 2723-2753, November.
    3. Ufuk Akcigit & Harun Alp & Michael Peters, 2021. "Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(1), pages 231-275, January.
    4. Bryan Hong & Lorenz Kueng & Mu-Jeung Yang, 2015. "Estimating Management Practice Complementarity between Decentralization and Performance Pay," NBER Working Papers 20845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Englmaier, Florian & Fahn, Matthias, 2018. "Size Matters - \'Over\'investments in a Relational Contracting Setting," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 62, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    6. Martin C. Byford & Joshua S. Gans, 2014. "Permission to Exist," NBER Working Papers 20512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Englmaier, Florian & Fahn, Matthias, 2014. "Size Matters - “Over†investments in a Relational Contracting Setting," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 506, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    8. Prat, Andrea & Dessein, Wouter, 2019. "Organizational Capital, Corporate Leadership, and Firm Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 13513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Cheng Chen, 2015. "Management Quality, Firm Organization and International Trade," 2015 Meeting Papers 53, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Laura Boudreau & Julia Cajal-Grossi & Rocco Macchiavello, 2023. "Global Value Chains in Developing Countries: A Relational Perspective from Coffee and Garments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 59-86, Summer.

  5. Daniel Barron & Michael Powell, 2019. "Policies in Relational Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 228-249, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Barron & Jin Li & Michał Zator, 2022. "Morale and Debt Dynamics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4496-4516, June.
    2. Alessandro De Chiara, 2015. "Precontractual Investment and Modes of Procurement," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-24, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Noel, Michael D. & Qiang, Hongjie, 2022. "Open price contracts, locked-in buyers, and opportunism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    4. Scur, Daniela & Lemos, Renata, 2019. "The ties that bind: implicit contracts and management practices in family-run firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 13794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Anil K. Jain, 2022. "Financing Repeat Borrowers: Designing Credible Incentives for Today and Tomorrow," International Finance Discussion Papers 1364, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Garrett, Daniel & Dilmé, Francesc, 2020. "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," CEPR Discussion Papers 14722, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2022. "Relational Contracts and Hierarchy," Monash Economics Working Papers 2022-08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    8. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Managing performance evaluation systems: Relational incentives in the presence of learning-by-shirking," Working Papers 2018-12, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.

  6. Rongzhu Ke & Jin Li & Michael Powell, 2018. "Managing Careers in Organizations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 197-252.

    Cited by:

    1. Radoslawa Nikolowa & Daniel Ferreira, 2018. "How to Sell Jobs," Working Papers 846, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    2. Schmutzler, Armin & Klein, Arnd Heinrich, 2014. "Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 10192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli & Francis Kramarz & Giovanni Pica, 2023. "Exploiting Growth Opportunities:The Role of Internal Labor Markets," Working Papers 686, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. Hans K. Hvide & Yanren Zhang, 2021. "Too big to succeed? Overstaffing in firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 784-798, November.
    5. Erika Deserranno & Philipp Kastrau & Gianmarco León-Ciliotta, 2021. "Promotions and productivity: The role of meritocracy and pay progression in the public sector," Economics Working Papers 1770, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    6. Jed DeVaro & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi‐task promotion tournaments with employer learning," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 335-376, April.
    7. Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli & Francis Kramarz & Giovanni Pica, 2016. "Insurance Between Firms: The Role of Internal Labor Markets," Development Working Papers 397, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 21 Jan 2020.
    8. Jie Gong & Ang Sun & Zhichao Wei, 2018. "Choosing the Pond: On-the-Job Experience and Long-Run Career Outcomes," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 860-872, February.
    9. Marianne Bertrand & Robin Burgess & Arunish Chawla & Guo Xu, 2020. "The Glittering Prizes: Career Incentives and Bureaucrat Performance," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 626-655.
    10. Santiago Bonilla & Sašo Polanec, 2021. "Organizational Hierarchies in the Slovenian Manufacturing Sector," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(6), pages 571-596, November.
    11. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2023. "Prestige, promotion, and pay," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118369, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Dana Foarta & Takuo Sugaya, 2021. "The management of talent: Optimal contracting for selection and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 49-77, March.
    13. Jed DeVaro & Antti Kauhanen & Nelli Valmari, 2019. "Internal and External Hiring," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(4), pages 981-1008, August.
    14. Alan Benson & Danielle Li & Kelly Shue, 2019. "Promotions and the Peter Principle," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 134(4), pages 2085-2134.
    15. Aisha J Ali & Javier Fuenzalida & Margarita Gómez & Martin J Williams, 2021. "Four lenses on people management in the public sector: an evidence review and synthesis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 335-366.
    16. Yanay Farja & Ori Zax, 2020. "Efficiency Wages with Endogenous Monitoring," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 248-261.

  7. Jin Li & Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell, 2017. "Power Dynamics in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 217-241, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Robert S. Gibbons & Manuel Grieder & Holger Herz & Christian Zehnder, 2019. "Building an Equilibrium: Rules Versus Principles in Relational Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 7871, CESifo.
    2. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks," Economics Working Papers 1690, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya, 2018. "Learning While Setting Precedents," Working Papers 18-001, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    4. Eliaz, Kfir & de Clippel, Geoffroy & Rozen, Kareen, 2016. "The Silent Treatment," CEPR Discussion Papers 11335, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Nicholas Economides, 2014. "Bundling and Tying," Working Papers 14-22, NET Institute.
    6. Liu, Dan & Meagher, Kieron J. & Wait, Andrew, 2022. "Market conditions and firm morality: Employee trust in the honesty of their managers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 89-106.
    7. Eliaz, Kfir & Rozen, Kareen & de Clippel, Geoffroy & Fershtman, Daniel, 2019. "On Selecting the Right Agent," CEPR Discussion Papers 13891, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2020. "Repeated delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    9. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Rulebooks in Relational Contracts," Working Papers 2019-7, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    10. Pai, Mallesh & Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew, 2020. "(Bad) Reputation in Relational Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2017. "Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 23919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic & Jennifer Soto, 2019. "Financing PPP Projects with PVR Contracts: Theory and Evidence from the UK and Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 347, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    13. Rahul Deb & Matthew Mitchell & Mallesh Pai, 2019. "Our distrust is very expensive," Working Papers tecipa-632, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    14. Newton, Jonathan & Wait, Andrew & Angus, Simon D., 2016. "Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture," Working Papers 2016-03, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    15. Daniel Barron & Robert Gibbons & Ricard Gil & Kevin J.Murphy, 2020. "Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1868-1889, May.
    16. Rantakari, Heikki, 2023. "How to reward honesty?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 129-145.
    17. Kishishita, Daiki, 2020. "(Not) delegating decisions to experts: The effect of uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    18. Katayama, Hajime & Meagher, Kieron J. & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Authority and communication in firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 315-348.
    19. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Monotone Contracts," Working Papers 1085, Barcelona School of Economics.
    20. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 111-150, November.
    21. Kieron Meagher & Andrew Wait, 2023. "Trust in management in organizations," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 507-507, April.
    22. Guo, Yingni & Hörner, Johannes, 2020. "Dynamic Allocation without Money," TSE Working Papers 20-1133, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    23. Yingni Guo & Johannes Hörner, 2021. "Dynamic Allocation without Money," Working Papers hal-03187506, HAL.
    24. Matthias Fahn & Anne Schade & Katharina Schüßler, 2017. "What Drives Reciprocal Behavior? The Optimal Provision of Incentives over the Course of Careers," CESifo Working Paper Series 6635, CESifo.
    25. Dessein, Wouter & Santos, Tano, 2019. "Managerial Style and Attention," CEPR Discussion Papers 13527, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    26. Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017. "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp605, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    27. Prat, Andrea & Dessein, Wouter, 2019. "Organizational Capital, Corporate Leadership, and Firm Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 13513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    28. Krasikov, Ilia & Lamba, Rohit, 2021. "A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    29. Garrett, Daniel & Dilmé, Francesc, 2020. "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," CEPR Discussion Papers 14722, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    30. Forand, Jean Guillaume & Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Production priorities in dynamic relationships," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    31. Ricard Gil & Myongjin Kim & Giorgio Zanarone, 2022. "Relationships Under Stress: Relational Outsourcing in the U.S. Airline Industry After the 2008 Financial Crisis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1256-1277, February.
    32. Chen, Ying & Oliver, Atara, 2023. "When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    33. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Managing performance evaluation systems: Relational incentives in the presence of learning-by-shirking," Working Papers 2018-12, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    34. Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee & Luis Vasconcelos, 2023. "What Makes Agility Fragile? A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Rigidity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3578-3601, June.
    35. Juan Escobar & Qiaoxi Zhang, 2019. "Delegating Learning," Documentos de Trabajo 348, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    36. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Screening for breakthroughs," Papers 2011.10090, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    37. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2021. "Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 476-491.
    38. Watson, Joel, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19f9w2xf, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

  8. Michael Powell, 2015. "An Influence-Cost Model of Organizational Practices and Firm Boundaries," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(suppl_1), pages 104-142.

    Cited by:

    1. Corgnet, Brice & Martin, Ludivine & Ndodjang, Peguy & Sutan, Angela, 2019. "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 23-45.
    2. Alain de Janvry & Guojun He & Elisabeth Sadoulet & Shaoda Wang & Qiong Zhang, 2020. "Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202003, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
    3. Laura Alfaro & Nick Bloom & Paola Conconi & Harald Fadinger & Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen & Nicholas Bloom, 2018. "Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation," CESifo Working Paper Series 7054, CESifo.
    4. Impink, Stephen Michael & Prat, Andrea & Sadun, Raffaella, 2021. "Communication within firms: evidence from CEO turnovers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 113873, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Moritz Mosenhauer, 2022. "Salience and management‐by‐exception," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3685-3697, December.
    6. Francisco Brahm & Jorge Tarziján, 2016. "Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between internal organization and vertical integration," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(12), pages 2481-2502, December.
    7. Brice Corgnet & Ludivine Martin & Peguy Ndodjang & Angela Sutan, 2015. "On the Merit of Equal Pay: When Influence Activities Interact with Incentive Setting," Working Papers 15-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    8. Mori, Yusuke, 2017. "A formal model of firm boundaries and haggling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 15-17.
    9. Yusuke Mori, 2013. "A Formal Theory of Firm Boundaries: A Trade-Off between Rent Seeking and Bargaining Costs," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-20, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    10. Stephen Michael Impink & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2021. "Communication within firms: evidence from CEO turnovers," POID Working Papers 014, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.

  9. Robert Gibbons & Richard Holden & Michael Powell, 2012. "Organization and Information: Firms' Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1813-1841.

    Cited by:

    1. Joshua S. Gans, 2023. "Artificial intelligence adoption in a competitive market," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(358), pages 690-705, April.
    2. Richard Holden & Anup Malani, 2022. "An Examination of Velocity and Initial Coin Offerings," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 9026-9041, December.
    3. Serfes, Konstantinos, 2013. "A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration under Two-Sided Productivity Heterogeneity," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2013-6, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, revised 06 Mar 2014.
    4. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Zingales, Luigi (ed.), 2016. "The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199826216.
    5. Bryan Hong & Lorenz Kueng & Mu-Jeung Yang, 2015. "Estimating Management Practice Complementarity between Decentralization and Performance Pay," NBER Working Papers 20845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Richard Holden & Anup Malani, 2019. "The ICO Paradox: Transactions Costs, Token Velocity, and Token Value," NBER Working Papers 26265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2014. "Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 82-117.
    8. Guido Maretto, 2017. "Diversification and screening," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp610, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    9. Guido Maretto, 2011. "Contracts and Market: Risk Sharing with Hidden Types," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2011-005, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    10. Bayo-Moriones, Alberto & Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique & Gil, Ricard, 2013. "'Make-or-Buy' of Peripheral Services in Manufacturing: Evidence from Spanish Plant-Level Data," IZA Discussion Papers 7138, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2013. "A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2013-004, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    12. Andrew F. Newman & Patrick Legros, 2011. "Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Survey," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-036, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    13. Newman, Andrew, 2012. "A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (Revised Version)," CEPR Discussion Papers 9004, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Albert H. Choi, 2015. "Non-Profit Status and Relational Sanctions: Commitment to Quality through Repeat Interactions and Organizational Choice," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4).

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  2. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  3. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (5) 2010-03-13 2010-03-13 2014-08-28 2014-09-08 2017-02-26. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (2) 2014-08-28 2014-09-08
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2014-08-28 2014-09-08
  4. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2014-08-28 2014-09-08
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2014-08-28 2014-09-08
  6. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (2) 2017-02-26 2021-06-28
  7. NEP-AGE: Economics of Ageing (1) 2021-04-12
  8. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2021-06-28
  9. NEP-EUR: Microeconomic European Issues (1) 2021-04-12
  10. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2014-09-08
  11. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages (1) 2021-04-12

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