IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/doi10.1086-684301.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Non-Profit Status and Relational Sanctions: Commitment to Quality through Repeat Interactions and Organizational Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Albert H. Choi

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Albert H. Choi, 2015. "Non-Profit Status and Relational Sanctions: Commitment to Quality through Repeat Interactions and Organizational Choice," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4).
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/684301
    DOI: 10.1086/684301
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/684301
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/684301
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/684301?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    2. Edward L. Glaeser, 2002. "The Governance of Not-For-Profit Firms," NBER Working Papers 8921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
    4. Glaeser, Edward L. & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "Not-for-profit entrepreneurs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 99-115, July.
    5. Sujoy Chakravarty & Martin Gaynor & Steven Klepper & William B. Vogt, 2006. "Does the profit motive make Jack nimble? Ownership form and the evolution of the US hospital industry," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 345-361, April.
    6. Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2009. "Quality, reputation and the choice of organizational form," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 515-527, August.
    7. David J. Deming & Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, 2012. "The For-Profit Postsecondary School Sector: Nimble Critters or Agile Predators?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(1), pages 139-164, Winter.
    8. David M. Cutler, 2000. "Introduction to "The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Institutions"," NBER Chapters, in: The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions, pages 1-10, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    10. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    11. Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, 1998. "Nonprofit Production and Competition," NBER Working Papers 6377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Anup Malani & Guy David, 2008. "Does Nonprofit Status Signal Quality?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 551-576, June.
    13. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-1156.
    14. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1998. "Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 172-204, February.
    15. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    16. Mark B. McClellan & Douglas O. Staiger, 2000. "Comparing Hospital Quality at For-Profit and Not- for-Profit Hospitals," NBER Chapters, in: The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions, pages 93-112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Burcay Erus & Burton Weisbrod, 2003. "Objective Functions and Compensation Structures in Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizations. Evidence from the "Mixed" Hospital Industry," NBER Chapters, in: The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations, pages 117-142, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Mark G. Duggan, 2000. "Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1343-1373.
    19. Chou, Shin-Yi, 2002. "Asymmetric information, ownership and quality of care: an empirical analysis of nursing homes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 293-311, March.
    20. Edward C. Norton & Douglas O. Staiger, 1994. "How Hospital Ownership Affects Access to Care for the Uninsured," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 171-185, Spring.
    21. Horwitz, Jill R. & Nichols, Austin, 2009. "Hospital ownership and medical services: Market mix, spillover effects, and nonprofit objectives," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 924-937, September.
    22. Pauly, Mark V & Redisch, Michael, 1973. "The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physicians' Cooperative," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 87-99, March.
    23. Susan Rose-Ackerman, 1996. "Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 701-728, June.
    24. David M. Cutler & Jill Horwitz, 2000. "Converting Hospitals from No t-for-Profit to For-Profit Status Why and What Effects?," NBER Chapters, in: The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions, pages 45-90, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    26. Edward L. Glaeser, 2003. "The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number glae03-1, March.
    27. Albert Choi & George Triantis, 2008. "Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 503-534, June.
    28. Robert Gibbons & Richard Holden & Michael Powell, 2012. "Organization and Information: Firms' Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1813-1841.
    29. David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, 1983. "The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 531-538, Autumn.
    30. David M. Cutler, 2000. "The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number cutl00-1, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Glaeser, Edward L. & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "Not-for-profit entrepreneurs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 99-115, July.
    2. Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, 2007. "What Do Nonprofits Maximize? Nonprofit Hospital Service Provision and Market Ownership Mix," NBER Working Papers 13246, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Mueller, Hannes, 2011. "Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 94-105.
    4. Marco Castaneda & Dino Falaschetti, 2008. "Does a Hospital’s Profit Status Affect its Operational Scope?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 33(2), pages 129-159, September.
    5. Horwitz, Jill R. & Nichols, Austin, 2009. "Hospital ownership and medical services: Market mix, spillover effects, and nonprofit objectives," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 924-937, September.
    6. Sabina Gandhi, 2012. "Differences between non-profit and for-profit hospices: patient selection and quality," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 107-127, June.
    7. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, 2001. "The Effects of Hospital Ownership on Medical Productivity," NBER Working Papers 8537, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Silverman, Elaine & Skinner, Jonathan, 2004. "Medicare upcoding and hospital ownership," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 369-389, March.
    9. Modhurima Dey Amin & Syed Badruddoza & Robert Rosenman, 2018. "Quality Differentiation Under Mixed Competition in Hospital Markets," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 473-484, December.
    10. Jill R. Horwitz, 2005. "Does Corporate Ownership Matter? Service Provision in the Hospital Industry," NBER Working Papers 11376, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Pierre Koning & Joëlle Noailly & Sabine Visser, 2007. "Do Not-For-Profits Make a Difference in Social Services? A Survey Study," De Economist, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 251-270, September.
    12. Paul Gertler & Jennifer Kuan, 2009. "Does It Matter Who Your Buyer Is? The Role of Nonprofit Mission in the Market for Corporate Control of Hospitals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(2), pages 295-306, May.
    13. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    14. Lien, Hsien-Ming & Chou, Shin-Yi & Liu, Jin-Tan, 2008. "Hospital ownership and performance: Evidence from stroke and cardiac treatment in Taiwan," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1208-1223, September.
    15. Jones, Daniel B. & Propper, Carol & Smith, Sarah, 2017. "Wolves in sheep’s clothing: Is non-profit status used to signal quality?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 108-120.
    16. Gaynor, Martin & Town, Robert J., 2011. "Competition in Health Care Markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: Mark V. Pauly & Thomas G. Mcguire & Pedro P. Barros (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 499-637, Elsevier.
    17. Yu-Chu Shen & Karen Eggleston & Joseph Lau & Christopher Schmid, 2005. "Hospital Ownership and Financial Performance: A Quantitative Research Review," NBER Working Papers 11662, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Paul A. Grout & Michelle J. Yong, 2003. "The Role of Donated Labour and Not for Profit at the Public/Private Interface," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/074, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    19. Shen, Yu-Chu, 2002. "The effect of hospital ownership choice on patient outcomes after treatment for acute myocardial infarction," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 901-922, September.
    20. Ettner, Susan L. & Hermann, Richard C., 2001. "The role of profit status under imperfect information: evidence from the treatment patterns of elderly Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized for psychiatric diagnoses," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 23-49, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/684301. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.