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Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between internal organization and vertical integration

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  • Francisco Brahm
  • Jorge Tarziján

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  • Francisco Brahm & Jorge Tarziján, 2016. "Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between internal organization and vertical integration," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(12), pages 2481-2502, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:stratm:v:37:y:2016:i:12:p:2481-2502
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    3. Mo Chen & Aseem Kaul & Brian Wu, 2019. "Adaptation across multiple landscapes: Relatedness, complexity, and the long run effects of coordination in diversified firms," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(11), pages 1791-1821, November.
    4. Vivek Tandon & Navid Asgari & Ram Ranganathan, 2023. "Divestment of relational assets following acquisitions: Evidence from the biopharmaceutical industry," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 1013-1052, April.

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