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Looking for a theory of the firm: Future challenges

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  • Garrouste, Pierre
  • Saussier, Stephane

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 58 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 178-199

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:58:y:2005:i:2:p:178-199

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References

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  1. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms," NBER Working Papers 7546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Marengo, Luigi, et al, 2000. "The Structure of Problem-Solving Knowledge and the Structure of Organizations," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(4), pages 757-88, December.
  3. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
  4. Saussier, Stephane, 2000. "Transaction costs and contractual incompleteness: the case of Electricite de France," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 189-206, June.
  5. Susan Athey & Scott Stern, 1998. "An Empirical Framework for Testing Theories About Complimentarity in Organizational Design," NBER Working Papers 6600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 1996. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9597, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  7. Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
  8. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Aoki, Masahiko, 1986. "Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 971-83, December.
  11. Dessein, Wouter, 2002. "Authority and Communication in Organizations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 811-38, October.
  12. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  13. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
  14. George Baker & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2001. "Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 189-194, May.
  15. Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, 1998. "The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 73-94, Fall.
  16. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
  17. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
  18. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. "The Logic of Economic Organization," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 65-93, Spring.
  19. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," NBER Working Papers 10397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Richard Langlois & Pierre Garrouste, 1996. "Cognition, Redundancy, and Learning in Organizations," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 1996-10, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  21. Michael D. Cohen & Roger Burkhart & Giovanni Dosi & Massimo Egidi & Luigi Marengo & Massimo Warglien & Sidney Winter & with comments by Benjamin Coriat, 1995. "Routines and Other Recurring Action Patterns of Organizations: Contemporary Research Issues," Working Papers, Santa Fe Institute 95-11-101, Santa Fe Institute.
  22. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
  23. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1999. "A Theory Of Wage And Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1321-1358, November.
  24. Michael D. Whinston, 2003. "On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 1-23, April.
  25. Crocker, K.J. & Masten, S.E., 1988. "Pretia Ex Machina?: Prices And Process In Long-Term Contracts," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 10-88-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  26. Kreps, David M, 1996. "Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 561-95.
  27. Oliver E. Williamson, 2002. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 171-195, Summer.
  28. Williamson, Oliver E, 1999. "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 306-42, April.
  29. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, October.
  30. Hart, Oliver D, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 119-39, Spring.
  31. Matouschek, Niko, 2002. "Information and the Optimal Ownership Structure of Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3216, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Scott E. Masten, 2002. "Modern Evidence on the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 428-432, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kam Ki Tang & Leopoldo Yanes, 2009. "The hierarchical structure of the firm: a geometric perspective," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2009(2), pages 156-175.
  2. Nathalie Lazaric & Alain Raybaut, 2007. "Knowledge, Hierarchy and incentives: Why human resource policy and trust matter," Post-Print hal-00453292, HAL.
  3. Robert Vitík, 2008. "Transactions cost and boundary of the firm," Ekonomika a Management, University of Economics, Prague, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2008(3).
  4. Lewis Evans & Graeme Guthrie & Neil Quigley, 2012. "Contemporary Microeconomic Foundations for the Structure and Management of the Public Sector," Treasury Working Paper Series 12/01, New Zealand Treasury.
  5. Fritz Rahmeyer, 2006. "From a Routine-Based to a Knowledge-Based View: Towards an Evolutionary Theory of the Firm," Discussion Paper Series, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics 283, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  6. Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Governance: Who Controls Matters," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-053, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  7. Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-027, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  8. Fritz Rahmeyer, 2010. "A Neo-Darwinian Foundation of Evolutionary Economics. With an Application to the Theory of the Firm," Discussion Paper Series, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics 309, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  9. James H. Love, 2010. "Opportunism, Hold-Up and the (Contractual) Theory of the Firm," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(3), pages 479-501, September.

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