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Policies in Relational Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Barron
  • Michael Powell

Abstract

We consider how a firm's policies constrain its relational contracts. A policy is a sequence of decisions made by a principal; each decision determines how agents' efforts affect their outputs. We consider surplus-maximizing policies in a flexible dynamic moral hazard problem between a principal and several agents with unrestricted vertical transfers and no commitment. If agents cannot coordinate to punish the principal following a deviation, then the principal might optimally implement dynamically inefficient, history-dependent policies to credibly reward high-performing agents. We develop conditions under which such backward-looking policies are surplus-maximizing and illustrate how they influence promotions, hiring, and performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Barron & Michael Powell, 2019. "Policies in Relational Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 228-249, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:11:y:2019:i:2:p:228-49
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170181
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F. Garrett, 2023. "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(3), pages 1025-1075, May.
    2. De Chiara, Alessandro, 2020. "Precontractual investment and modes of procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    3. Noel, Michael D. & Qiang, Hongjie, 2022. "Open price contracts, locked-in buyers, and opportunism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    4. Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2022. "Relational Contracts and Hierarchy," Monash Economics Working Papers 2022-08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    5. Daniel Barron & Jin Li & Michał Zator, 2022. "Morale and Debt Dynamics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4496-4516, June.
    6. Anil K. Jain, 2022. "Financing Repeat Borrowers: Designing Credible Incentives for Today and Tomorrow," International Finance Discussion Papers 1364, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Managing performance evaluation systems: Relational incentives in the presence of learning-by-shirking," Working Papers 2018-12, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    8. Scur, Daniela & Lemos, Renata, 2019. "The ties that bind: implicit contracts and management practices in family-run firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 13794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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