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Operationalising the selection and application of macroprudential instruments

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  • Bank for International Settlements
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    Abstract

    This report - prepared by a Working Group chaired by José-Manuel González-Páramo, formerly European Central Bank - aims to help policymakers in operationalising macroprudential policies. Specifically, it draws out three high-level criteria that are key in determining the selection and application of macroprudential instruments: 1.the ability to determine the appropriate timing for the activation or deactivation of the instrument; 2.the effectiveness of the instrument in achieving the stated policy objective; and 3.the efficiency of the instrument in terms of a cost-benefit assessment. In trying to operationalise these criteria, this report proposes a number of practical tools. First, to help determine the appropriate timing for the activation and deactivation of instruments, it lays out stylised scenarios. Their identification is facilitated by two alternative approaches that seek to link systemic risk analysis and instrument selection. Second, to support the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of macroprudential tools for a range of macroprudential instruments, the report proposes "transmission maps" - stylised presentations of how changes in individual instruments are expected to contribute to the objectives of macroprudential policy.

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    Bibliographic Info

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    This book is provided by Bank for International Settlements in its series CGFS Papers with number 48 and published in 2012.

    ISBN: 92-9197-897-3
    Handle: RePEc:bis:biscgf:48

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