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Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics

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  • Ian Christensen
  • Césaire Meh
  • Kevin Moran

    ()

Abstract

This paper assesses the merits of countercyclical bank balance sheet regulation for the stabilization of financial and economic cycles and examines its interaction with monetary policy. The framework used is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelwith banks and bank capital, in which bank capital solves an asymmetric information problem between banks and their creditors. In this economy, the lending decisions of individual banks affect the riskiness of the whole banking sector, though banks do not internalize this impact. Regulation, in the form of a constraint on bank leverage, can mitigate the impact of this externality by inducing banks to alter the intensity of their monitoring efforts. We find that countercyclical bank leverage regulation can have desirable stabilization properties, particularly when financial shocks are an important source of economic fluctuations. However, the appropriate contribution of countercyclical capital requirements to stabilization after a technology shock depends on the size of the externality and on the conduct of the monetary authority.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2011s-76.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 2011
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-76

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Keywords: Moral hazard; bank capital; countercyclical capital requirements; leverage; monetary policy;

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  1. Marco Terrones & M. Ayhan Kose & Stijn Claessens, 2008. "What Happens During Recessions, Crunches, and Busts?," IMF Working Papers 08/274, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist, 1998. "The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework," NBER Working Papers 6455, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Francisco Covas & Shigeru Fujita, 2010. "Procyclicality of Capital Requirements in a General Equilibrium Model of Liquidity Dependence," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(34), pages 137-173, December.
  4. Meh, Césaire A. & Moran, Kevin, 2010. "The role of bank capital in the propagation of shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 555-576, March.
  5. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 1997. "Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory," Economics Working Papers 350, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 1999.
  6. Carmen M. Reinhart & Graciela L. Kaminsky, 1999. "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 473-500, June.
  7. Christiano, Lawrence & Rostagno, Massimo & Motto, Roberto, 2010. "Financial factors in economic fluctuations," Working Paper Series 1192, European Central Bank.
  8. Carlstrom, Charles T & Fuerst, Timothy S, 1997. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 893-910, December.
  9. Claudio Borio & Mathias Drehmann, 2009. "Assessing the risk of banking crises - revisited," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March.
  10. Angelini, Paolo & Neri, Stefano & Panetta, Fabio, 2012. "Monetary and macroprudential policies," Working Paper Series 1449, European Central Bank.
  11. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Pau Rabanal & Christopher W. Crowe & Deniz Igan, 2011. "Policies for Macrofinancial Stability: Options to Deal with Real Estate Booms," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 11/02, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Christopher J. Erceg & Dale W. Henderson & Andrew T. Levin, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy with staggered wage and price contracts," International Finance Discussion Papers 640, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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Cited by:
  1. Claudio Borio, 2011. "Rediscovering the Macroeconomic Roots of Financial Stability Policy: Journey, Challenges, and a Way Forward," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 87-117, December.
  2. Yasin Mimir & Enes Sunel & Temel Taskin, 2012. "Required Reserves as a Credit Policy Tool," Working Papers 1224, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
  3. Martin Berka & Christian Zimmermann, 2011. "Basel Accord and financial intermediation: the impact of policy," Working Papers 2011-042, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  4. Dieter Gramlich & Mikhail V. Oet & Stephen J. Ong, 2013. "Policy in adaptive financial markets—the use of systemic risk early warning tools," Working Paper 1309, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  5. Paolo Angelini & Laurent Clerc & Vasco Cúrdia & Leonardo Gambacorta & Andrea Gerali & Alberto Locarno & Roberto Motto & Werner Roeger & Skander Van den Heuvel & Jan Vlcek, 2011. "Basel III: Long-term impact on economic performance and fluctuations," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 87, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  6. Fabrice Collard & Harris Dellas & Behzad Diba & Olivier Loisel, 2012. "Optimal Monetary and Prudential Policies," Working Papers 2012-34, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  7. Axel A. Weber, 2011. "Challenges for monetary policy in the European Monetary Union," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue July, pages 235-242.
  8. Tobias Adrian & Daniel Covitz & Nellie Liang, 2013. "Financial stability monitoring," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2013-21, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  9. Bank for International Settlements, 2012. "Operationalising the selection and application of macroprudential instruments," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 48, January.
  10. Karmakar, Sudipto, 2013. "Macroprudential Regulation and Macroeconomic Activity," MPRA Paper 52172, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Tommaso Trani, 2012. "Countercyclical Capital Regulation and Bank Ownership Structure," IHEID Working Papers 14-2012, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
  12. Tobias Adrian, 2012. "Discussion of “An Integrated Framework for Multiple Financial Regulations”," Staff Reports 583, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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