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What the FCC auctions can tell us about the performativity thesis

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  • Nik-Khah, Edward

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  • Nik-Khah, Edward, 2006. "What the FCC auctions can tell us about the performativity thesis," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 7(2), pages 15-21.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:econso:155863
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/155863/1/vol07-no02-a4.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert J. Weber, 1997. "Making More from Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 529-548, September.
    2. Charles R. Plott, 1997. "Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 605-638, September.
    3. Swedberg, Richard, 2004. "On the present state of economic sociology (1990s)," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 5(2), pages 2-17.
    4. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
    5. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
    6. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "Ascending Proxy Auctions," Discussion Papers 03-035, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    7. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    8. John O. Ledyard & David Porter & Antonio Rangel, 1997. "Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 639-675, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guala, Francesco, 2006. "Getting the FCC auctions straight: A reply to Nik-Khah," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 7(3), pages 23-28.
    2. N/A, 2012. "Games and Prizes in the Economic (and Geographical?) Performance of Markets: Nobel, Shapley, and Roth," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 44(11), pages 2542-2545, November.
    3. Sarah Bracking, 2012. "How do Investors Value Environmental Harm/Care? Private Equity Funds, Development Finance Institutions and the Partial Financialization of Nature-based Industries," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 43(1), pages 271-293, January.

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