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Minimising the inflationary impact of fiscal deficits in Africa: The role of monetary, financial and political institutions

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  • Abel M. Agoba

Abstract

This is an examination of the relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation in Africa based on the premise that the characteristics of monetary, financial and political institutions, do impact the nature of this relationship. The study hypothesizes that, the inflationary effect of fiscal deficits is minimised when the central bank is independent (CBI) and the financial market is developed enough to contain inflationary expectations. This impact is much more effective given stronger political institutions. Using a panel data spanning 1970–2012 for 48 African countries, we use a Two Stage System Generalised Methods of Moments estimator, with Windmeijer (2005) corrected SE and collapsed instruments to address the issue of instrument proliferation. We also use various measures of central bank independence, financial development and political institutional quality. Fiscal deficits are inflationary in Africa. The positive effect of fiscal deficits on inflation is weakened when the degrees of Central Bank Independence (CBI) and financial development are higher. Financial development minimises the modulating impact of lower CBI on inflationary fiscal deficits. While stronger political institutions minimise the dampening effect of high central bank turnover on inflationary fiscal deficits, it enhances the positive impact of stronger central bank independence and financial development on minimising inflationary fiscal deficits. The results are robust to varying measures of CBI, financial development, and political institutions. Africa's financial sector should therefore be developed alongside strengthening the independence of central banks and ensuring that the quality of political institutions are enhanced in order to effectively curtail inflationary fiscal deficits.

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  • Abel M. Agoba, 2021. "Minimising the inflationary impact of fiscal deficits in Africa: The role of monetary, financial and political institutions," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 724-740, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:ijfiec:v:26:y:2021:i:1:p:724-740
    DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.1813
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