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Central Bank Independence Before and After the Crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Jakob Haan

    (University of Groningen
    De Nederlandsche Bank
    CESifo)

  • Christina Bodea

    (Michigan State University)

  • Raymond Hicks

    (Princeton University)

  • Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

    (CESifo
    Tilburg University
    CEPR)

Abstract

This paper discusses whether central bank independence (CBI) has changed since the financial crisis. Central banks’ quasi-fiscal policies during and after the crisis, and macro-prudential and unconventional monetary policies, which are more redistributive than traditional monetary policy, have led to questions about the desirability of CBI. Some even argue that CBI is under threat. However, a survey among central bankers and updates of legal proxies for CBI do not provide strong evidence that CBI has diminished since the financial crisis. The only indication for this is the increase in the turnover rate of central bank governors in advanced countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Jakob Haan & Christina Bodea & Raymond Hicks & Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger, 2018. "Central Bank Independence Before and After the Crisis," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 60(2), pages 183-202, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:compes:v:60:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1057_s41294-017-0050-4
    DOI: 10.1057/s41294-017-0050-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank independence; Central bank accountability; Unconventional monetary policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System

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