The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs
AbstractThe authors develop a partial equilibrium matching model of the labor market in order to examine whether adoption of a reemployment bonus would displace workers not offered the bonus. They examine the displacement effect for (1) unemployment-insurance-eligible workers who are offered but do not find a job in time to qualify for a bonus and (2) unemployment-insurance-ineligible workers who are never offered a bonus. The model predicts minimal displacement of the former group. But for the latter group, the model predicts an increase in unemployment duration of 0.2-0.4 week and an increase in unemployment of up to two per thousand. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/
Other versions of this item:
- Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, . "The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles cdsaw1993, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
- Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, 1990. "The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles 90-02, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
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