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Wage Subsidies for Dislocated Workers

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Author Info
Carl Davidson (Michigan State University)
Stephen A. Woodbury () (W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research)

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Abstract

An array of innovative policies has been suggested to address more effectively the needs of dislocated workers. In this paper, we model and simulate the impacts of a wage-rate subsidy (or salary supplement) program in which a dislocated worker who becomes reemployed would receive a payment equal to one-half the difference between the wage previously earned and the wage currently earned. The simulations are based on a search model that is institutionally rich and that provides estimates of the impacts of a wage subsidy by incorporating empirical results from the reemployment bonus experiments that were conducted in the mid- to late-1980s. The model includes several groups of workers other than dislocated workers and therefore provides estimates of the degree to which these other workers might be crowded out of jobs by the wage subsidy program. The results suggest that a wage-rate subsidy paid for two years after reemployment would shorten the unemployment spells of dislocated workers by nearly 2 weeks, and would increase employment of dislocated workers by about 900 to 1000 per 100,000 in the labor force. But the simulations also raise the possibility that the gains for dislocated workers could come at the expense of other groups of workers; that is, other groups of workers could experience small increases in unemployment duration, and decreases in employment levels that almost fully offset the gains for dislocated workers. Three factors may mitigate these crowding-out results crowding out is widely dispersed over various groups of non-dislocated workers, the structural changes that result in dislocation of some workers (and drive the need for a policy like a wage subsidy) benefit non-dislocated workers, and the crowding-out results are quite sensitive to one of our assumptions. We also compare the wage-rate subsidy program with a reemployment bonus, and show that the two can be structured so as to give identical results.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in its series Staff Working Papers with number 95-31.

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Date of creation: Jan 1995
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Handle: RePEc:upj:weupjo:95-31

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Related research
Keywords: dislocated; displaced; workers; wage; subsidies; Davidson; Woodbury;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Blank, Rebecca M & Card, David E, 1991. "Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemployment: Is There an Explanation?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1157-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Abraham, Katharine G, 1983. "Structural-Frictional vs. Deficient Demand Unemployment: Some New Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 708-24, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Phillip B. Levine, 1993. "Spillover effects between the insured and uninsured unemployed," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 47(1), pages 73-86, October.
  4. Kim B. Clark & Lawrence H. Summers, 1984. "Unemployment Insurance and Labor Force Transitions," NBER Working Papers 0920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hurd, Michael D. & Pencavel, John H., 1981. "A utility-based analysis of the wage subsidy program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 185-201, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Louis S. Jacobson & Robert J. LaLonde & Daniel Sullivan, 1992. "Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers," Staff Working Papers 92-11, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Katz, Lawrence F. & Meyer, Bruce D., 1990. "The impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 45-72, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-79, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(2), pages 217-27, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, 1990. "The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs," Staff Working Papers 90-02, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lawrence F. Katz, 1996. "Wage Subsidies for the Disadvantaged," NBER Working Papers 5679, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment: Implications of the Reemployment Bonus Experiments," Staff Working Papers 96-44, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher, 2001. "Taxes, Subsidies and Equilibrium Labour Market Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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