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Fiscal Illusion, Intergovernmental Grants and Local Spending

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Author Info
Muhammed N. Islam
Abstract

ISLAM M. N. (1998) Fiscal illusion, intergovernmental grants and local spending, Reg. Studies 32 , 63-71. This paper provides some evidence of fiscal illusion of a reduced tax-price of public service, engendered by provincial grants to local governments. A model of fiscal response to grants, based on expected vote maximization approach, is tested on time series data as well as pooled time series and cross-section data for 39 upper-tier municipalities in Ontario over the period 1977-91. A generalized two-stage least square procedure is used to estimate the model, adjusting for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity in errors and simultaneity between grants and expenditures. The results show that the fiscally-induced price effects of grants varies quite widely from one municipality to another and these variations can be attributed to differences in municipal characteristics and their institutional relations with the province. Additionally, the results show evidence of considerable tax exporting (and importing) to (and from) non-residents. ISLAM M. N.(1998) L'illusion fiscale, les primes intergouvernementales et les dépenses locales, Reg. Studies 32 , 63-71. Cet article fournit quelques preuves de ''l'illusion fiscale'' du prix des services publics assorti d'une réduction d'impôt, ce qui s'explique par l'octroi des primes régionales aux administrations locales. A partir de la façon fondée sur la maximisation des votes attendus, un modèle de la sensibilité de la fiscalitéaux primes se voit tester employant des données en série temporelle aussi bien que des données en série temporelle et par section représentitative mises en commun pour 39 municipalités du niveau supérieur en Ontario de 1977 à 1991. Une méthode des moindres carrés à deux étapes généralisée se voit employer afin d'estimer le modèle, en ajustant pour l'autocorrélation, la possibilitédes erreurs diverses et la simultanéitéentre les primes et les dépenses. Les résultats laissent voir que les effets-prix des primes provoqués par la fiscalité varient de façon non-négligeable suivant la municipalité et ces variations peuvent être attribuées aux caractéristiques particulières des municipalités et à leurs rapports institutionnels avec la région. Qui plus est, les résultats font preuve d'une ''exportation d'impôt'' (et d'une importation d'impôt) à destination (et en provenance) des non-résidents. ISLAM M. N. (1998) Finanzpolitische Illusionen, Zuschüsse auf verschiedenen Regierungebenen und örtliche Aufwendungen, Reg. Studies 32 , 63-71. Dieser Aufsatz legt Anzeichen 'fiskalischer Illusionen' herabgesetzter Steuerkosten öffentlicher Dienste vor, die durch Zuschüsse der Provinzialregierung an Ortsverwaltungen erzeugt werden. Ein Modell fiskalischer Reaktion auf Zuschüsse, das auf einem Ansatz zu erwartender Höchstabgabe von Stimmen beruht, wird sowohl auf Zeitseriendaten wie auf gemeinsame Zeitserien und Querschnittsdaten für 39 städtische Gemeindeoberverwaltungen in Ontario für den Zeitraum 1977- 1991 geprüft. Ein verallgemeinertes, zwei Etappen umfassendes Least Squareverfahren wird dazu benutzt, das Modell zu schätzen, wobei Angleichungen zur Autokorrelation, Heteroskedastizität bei Fehlern und Gleichzeitigkeit von Zuschüssen und Ausgaben vorgenommen werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, daß die fiskalisch herbeigeführten Preisauswirkungen von Zuschüssen von einer Stadtverwaltung zur andern sehr verschieden sind, und daß diese Abweichungen den Unterschieden im städtischen Charakter und ihren institutionellen Beziehungen zu der Provinz zuzuschreiben sind. Außerdem weisen die Ergebnisse Anzeichen beträchtlicher 'Steuerexporte' (und - importe) an (und von) nicht am Orte Ansässigen auf.

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Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Regional Studies.

Volume (Year): 32 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 63-71
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Handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:32:y:1998:i:1:p:63-71

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Related research
Keywords: Fiscal Illusion Grants Local Expenditures Separation Of Spending And Taxing Gls Estimates;

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  1. Pommerehne, Werner W & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "Fiscal Illusion, Political Institutions, and Local Public Spending," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 381-408.
  2. Dougan, William R & Kenyon, Daphne A, 1988. "Pressure Groups and Public Expenditures: The Flypaper Effect Reconsidered," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 159-70, January.
  3. Winer, Stanley L, 1983. "Some Evidence on the Effect of the Separation of Spending and Taxing Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(1), pages 126-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Logan, Robert R, 1986. "Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1304-18, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Breusch, T S & Pagan, A R, 1980. "The Lagrange Multiplier Test and Its Applications to Model Specification in Econometrics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 239-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Slack, N Enid, 1980. "Local Fiscal Response to Intergovernmental Transfers," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(3), pages 364-70, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Fisher, Ronald C., 1982. "Income and grant effects on local expenditure: The flypaper effect and other difficulties," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 324-345, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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