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Selektionseffekte und Vermittlungserfolge privater Arbeitsvermittlung

Author

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  • Christian Grund

    (RWTH Aachen)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Vor nunmehr 10 Jahren wurde das Vermittlungsmonopol der Bundesagentur für Arbeit abgeschafft. Seitdem ist die Vermittlung von Arbeitnehmern an Unternehmen auch für private Agenturen möglich. In diesem Beitrag werden auf Grundlage suchund signaltheoretischer Überlegungen mögliche Selektionseffekte durch private Arbeitsvermittler und deren Vermittlungserfolg im Vergleich zur Bundesagentur für Arbeit empirisch untersucht. Es zeigt sich, dass Selektionseffekte in der Form Relevanz besitzen, dass sich sowohl die vermittelten Personen als auch die Jobs deutlich voneinander unterscheiden. Selbst unter Kontrolle etlicher personen- und jobspezifischer Merkmale sind positive Vermittlungsdifferentiale in Form höherer Löhne bei Vermittlungen über private Agenturen zu beobachten. Die entsprechenden Personen verfügten aber auch bereits auf ihrer letzten Arbeitstelle über höhere Löhne.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Grund, 2006. "Selektionseffekte und Vermittlungserfolge privater Arbeitsvermittlung," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 212-234, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:58:y:2006:i:2:d:10.1007_bf03371651
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371651
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    J64; M12; M54;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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