An agenda-setting model of electoral competition
AbstractThis paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of the public agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition compete in elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience to an issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal alternative to the status-quo. Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broad consensus on some policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probability of victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. Remarkably, the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may not be given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survive in spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad consensus on a policy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of the United States presidential election in 2004.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Spanish Economic Association in its journal SERIEs.
Volume (Year): 3 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Other versions of this item:
- Josep M. Colomer & Humberto Llavador, 2008. "An Agenda-Setting Model of Electoral Competition," Working Papers 331, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Josep M. Colomer & Humberto Llavador, 2008. "An agenda-setting model of electoral competition," Economics Working Papers 1070, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2010.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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124, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Schipper, Burkhard C. & Woo, Hee Yeul, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 2012-04, University of California at Davis, Department of Economics.
- Enriqueta Aragon�s & Micael Castanheira & Marco Giani, 2012.
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- Aragonés, Enriqueta & Castanheira, Micael & Giani, Marco, 2012. "Electoral Competition through Issue Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 9012, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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