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Indicators of Electoral Victory

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Author Info
Pablo Amoros () (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga)
M. Socorro Puy () (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga)

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Abstract

We study a two-party contest where candidates strategically allocate their campaign resources between two salient issues. We analyze to what extent the following indicators of a party's success predict the electoral victory: (1) the pre-campaign advantage, (2) the advantage on every salient issue, and (3) the advantage on campaign resources. We show that the electoral victory is guaranteed only when a party has a "sufficiently large" advantage on every salient issue. Otherwise no combination of these indicators ensures the electoral victory.

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File URL: http://webdeptos.uma.es/THEconomica/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2008-8.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2008-8.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2008-8

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Related research
Keywords: Election campaign salient issues majority voting

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Laffond, G. & Laine, J., 2006. "Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 49-66, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-25.

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