Indicators of Electoral Victory
AbstractWe study a two-party contest where candidates strategically allocate their campaign resources between two salient issues. We analyze to what extent the following indicators of a party's success predict the electoral victory: (1) the pre-campaign advantage, (2) the advantage on every salient issue, and (3) the advantage on campaign resources. We show that the electoral victory is guaranteed only when a party has a "sufficiently large" advantage on every salient issue. Otherwise no combination of these indicators ensures the electoral victory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2008-8.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
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Election campaign; salient issues; majority voting;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-04-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-04-29 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- AMOROS, Pablo & PUY, M. Socorro, 2007. "Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign?," CORE Discussion Papers 2007084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Josep Colomer & Humberto Llavador, 2012.
"An agenda-setting model of electoral competition,"
Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 73-93, March.
- Josep M. Colomer & Humberto Llavador, 2008. "An agenda-setting model of electoral competition," Economics Working Papers 1070, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2010.
- Josep M. Colomer & Humberto Llavador, 2008. "An Agenda-Setting Model of Electoral Competition," Working Papers 331, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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