Indicators of electoral victory
AbstractWe study a two-party contest where candidates strategically allocate their campaign resources between two salient issues. We analyze to what extent the following indicators of a party's success predict the electoral victory: (1) the pre-campaign advantage, (2) the advantage on every salient issue, and (3) the advantage on campaign resources. We show that the electoral victory is guaranteed only when a party has a "sufficiently large" advantage on every salient issue. Otherwise no combination of these indicators ensures the electoral victory.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 144 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Election campaign; Salient issues; Majority voting; Ostrogorski paradox; D72; C70;
Other versions of this item:
- Pablo Amoros & M. Socorro Puy, 2008. "Indicators of Electoral Victory," Working Papers, Universidad de MÃ¡laga, Department of Economic Theory, MÃ¡laga Economic Theory Research Center 2008-8, Universidad de MÃ¡laga, Department of Economic Theory, MÃ¡laga Economic Theory Research Center.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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- AMOROS, Pablo & PUY, M. Socorro, 2007. "Dialogue or issue divergence in the political campaign?," CORE Discussion Papers, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2007084, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Josep M. Colomer & Humberto Llavador, 2008.
"An Agenda-Setting Model of Electoral Competition,"
331, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Pablo Amorós & M. Puy, 2013. "Issue convergence or issue divergence in a political campaign?," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 355-371, June.
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