The bargaining set of a large game
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 43 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Milchtaich, Igal, 1998. "Vector Measure Games Based on Measures with Values in an Infinite Dimensional Vector Space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 25-46, July.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
- TamÂs Solymosi, 1999. "On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 229-240.
- Yevgenia Apartsin & Ron Holzman, 2003. "The core and the bargaining set in glove-market games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 189-204, December.
- Einy, Ezra & Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1997. "Core Equivalence Theorems for Infinite Convex Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-12, September.
- Ron Holzman, 2001. "The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 543-553.
- Einy, Ezra & Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov, 1999. "On the Least Core and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 181-188, August.
- Massimiliano Amarante & F. Maccheroni & M. Marinacci & L. Montrucchio, 2005.
"Cores of non-atomic market games,"
0506-10, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2005. "Stable cores of large games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 189-213, 06.
- Luigi Montrucchio & Patrizia Semeraro, 2006. "Refinement Derivatives and Values of Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 9, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Massimiliano Amarante & Fabio Maccheroni, 2006. "When an Event Makes a Difference," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 119-126, 05.
- Tourky, Rabee & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2001. "Markets with Many More Agents than Commodities: Aumann's "Hidden" Assumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 189-221, November.
- Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2003. "Cores and stable sets of finite dimensional games," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 07-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
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