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Representation of Epstein-Marinacci derivatives of absolutely continuous TU games

Author

Listed:
  • Francesca Centrone

    (Dipartimento di Studi per l''Economia e l''Impresa, Università del Piemonte Orientale)

Abstract

We show that, for some classes of transferable utility (TU) games widely used in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Epstein and Marinacci derivatives have a natural representation in terms of a "generalized" Radon-Nikodym derivative. This has a straightforward interpretation in a General Equilibrium context, where marginal contributions can be seen as a fair way to reward each group of agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesca Centrone, 2016. "Representation of Epstein-Marinacci derivatives of absolutely continuous TU games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 1149-1159.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-14-00172
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Itzhak Gilboa, 2004. "Uncertainty in Economic Theory," Post-Print hal-00756317, HAL.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-additive set functions; Shapley value; non-atomic games; derivatives of transferable utility (TU) games; Radon-Nikodym derivative; marginal contributions; production economy; General Equilibrium.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General

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