Cores of non-atomic market games
AbstractWe study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility co- operative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley , and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz . We show that the core of such games is norm compact and some related results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our .ndings.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Massimiliano Amarante & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2006. "Cores of Non-Atomic Market Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 13, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Massimiliano Amarante & F. Maccheroni & M. Marinacci & L. Montrucchio, 2005. "Cores of non-atomic market games," Discussion Papers 0506-10, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marinacci, Massimo & Montrucchio, Luigi, 2003.
"Subcalculus for set functions and cores of TU games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
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- repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00177057 is not listed on IDEAS
- Massimo Marinacci & Fabio Maccheroni & Alain Chateauneuf & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2003.
"Monotone Continuous Multiple Priors,"
ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series
30-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
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- Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz & Ezra Einy, 1999. "The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-14.
- Neyman, Abraham, 2002. "Values of games with infinitely many players," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 56, pages 2121-2167 Elsevier.
- Massimiliano Amarante & Luigi Montrucchio, 2007. "Mas-Colell Bargaining Set of Large Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 63, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Massimiliano Amarante & Luigi Montrucchio, 2010. "The bargaining set of a large game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 313-349, June.
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