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Stable cores of large games

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Author Info
Massimo Marinacci ()
Luigi Montrucchio ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820400191
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 33 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Pages: 189-213
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:2:p:189-213

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Related research
Keywords: TV games; vN-M stable sets; large cores; bargaining sets;

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Massimiliano Amarante & F. Maccheroni & M. Marinacci & L. Montrucchio, 2005. "Cores of non-atomic market games," Discussion Papers 0506-10, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Luigi Montrucchio & Patrizia Semeraro, 2006. "Refinement Derivatives and Values of Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 9, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  3. Massimiliano Amarante & Luigi Montrucchio, 2007. "Mas-Colell Bargaining Set of Large Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 63, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  4. Massimo Marinacci & Fabio Maccheroni & Alain Chateauneuf & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2003. "Monotone Continuous Multiple Priors," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 30-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-22.

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