# The Core of Large TU Games

## Author Info

• Larry G. Epstein

()
(University of Rochester)

• Massimo Marinacci

()
(University of Torino)

Registered author(s):

## Abstract

For non-atomic TU games nu satisfying suitable conditions, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of nu. Further, such computations yield one of two stark conclusions: either core(nu) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of $\nu$. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus.

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File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_469.pdf
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## Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 469.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:469

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

## Related research

Keywords: core; transferable utility; non atomic game;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

## References

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1. David Schmeidler, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7662, David K. Levine.
2. Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz & Ezra Einy, 1999. "The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-14.
3. Epstein, Larry G, 1999. "A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 579-608, July.
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