Report NEP-GTH-2000-06-05

Subscribe to this report: email or RSS

Other reports in NEP-GTH

The following items were anounced in this report:

• Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 1999. "Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9905, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
• Randall L. Clavert, . "Establishing Cooperation Without Pre-Play Communication," Wallis Working Papers WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
• Larry G. Epstein & Massimo Marinacci, 2000. "The Core of Large TU Games," RCER Working Papers 469, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
• Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2000. "Amissibility and Common Belief," Research Papers in Economics 2000:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
• Randall L. Clavert & Nathan Dietz, . "Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities," Wallis Working Papers WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
• Asheim, Geir B, 2000. "Deductive reasoning in Extensive Games," Research Papers in Economics 2000:7, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 1999. "Procurement and Information Feedback," Research Papers in Economics 2000:2, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
• Hamid Sabourian, 2000. "Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1249, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
• Camerer, Colin & Knez, Marc, 2000. "Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination," Working Papers 1080, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]

This page was last updated on 2009-12-13.