Cores of Non-Atomic Market Games
AbstractWe study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility co- operative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley , and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz . We show that the core of such games is norm compact and some related results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our .ndings.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 13.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory
Cores; TU Games; Market Games;
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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