We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility co- operative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [9]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and some related results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our .ndings.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number
13.
Length: 31 pages Date of creation: 2006 Date of revision: Publication status: Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:13
Massimiliano Amarante & F. Maccheroni & M. Marinacci & L. Montrucchio, 2005.
"Cores of non-atomic market games,"
Discussion Papers
0506-10, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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