On the coincidence between the Shimomuras bargaining sets and the core
AbstractA necessary condition for the coincidence of the bargaining sets de ned by Shimomura (1997) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility is provided. To this aim, a set of payo vectors, called max-payo vectors, are introduced. This necessary condition simply checks whether these vectors are core elements of the game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 241.
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Date of creation: 2010
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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