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On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games

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Author Info
TamÂs Solymosi () (Department of Operations Research, Budapest University of Economic Sciences, 1828 Budapest, Pf. 489, Hungary)

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Abstract

We prove that for superadditive games a necessary and sufficient condition for the bargaining set to coincide with the core is that the monotonic cover of the excess game induced by a payoff be balanced for each imputation in the bargaining set. We present some new results obtained by verifying this condition for specific classes of games. For N-zero-monotonic games we show that the same condition required at each kernel element is also necessary and sufficient for the kernel to be contained in the core. We also give examples showing that to maintain these characterizations, the respective assumptions on the games cannot be lifted.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 28 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 229-240
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:229-240

Note: Received: March 1998/Revised version: December 1998
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Related research
Keywords: Cooperative games · bargaining set · core · kernel;

Cited by:
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  1. Sudhoelter,P. & Potters,J.A.M., 1999. "The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game," Working Papers 313, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Grahn, Sofia, 2001. "Core and Bargaining Set of Shortest Path Games," Working Paper Series 2001:3, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Marina Nunez Oliva & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2001. "The extreme core allocations of the assignment game," Working Papers in Economics 65, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia. [Downloadable!]
  4. Massimiliano Amarante & Luigi Montrucchio, 2007. "Mas-Colell Bargaining Set of Large Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 63, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hendrickx, R. & Borm, P. & Timmer, J., 2000. "On convexity for NTU-games," Discussion Paper 108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2002. "Coalitionally Monotonic Set-solutions for Cooperative TU Games," Working Papers in Economics 75, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia. [Downloadable!]
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