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Assignment Games with a Central Player

Author

Listed:
  • Saadia El Obadi

    (University of Lleida)

  • Silvia Miquel

    (University of Lleida)

Abstract

We introduce a two-sided market situation with a central player. This player plays both the role of buyer and seller. From this situation we consider the corresponding TU-game and describe the core of the game in terms of the market data. We also study two point solutions: the nucleolus and the $$\tau $$τ-value. When we allow the central player to have multiple partners, the game is still balanced and each competitive equilibrium provides a core allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Saadia El Obadi & Silvia Miquel, 2019. "Assignment Games with a Central Player," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(6), pages 1129-1148, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:28:y:2019:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-019-09638-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-019-09638-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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