Assignment markets with the same core
AbstractIn the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a nite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a characterization of the minimal elements. A sucient condition under which the join-semilattice reduces to a lattice is also given.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 239.
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Date of creation: 2010
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- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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