A Simple Procedure to Obtain the Extreme Core Allocations of an Assignment Market
AbstractGiven an assignment market, we introduce a set of vectors, one for each possible ordering on the player set, which we name the max-payoff vectors. Each one of these vectors is obtained recursively only making use of the assignment matrix. Those max-payoff vectors that are efficient turn up to give the extreme core allocations of the market. When the assignment market has large core (that is to say, the assignment matrix is dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal) all the max-payoff vectors are extreme core allocations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 275.
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
assignment game; core; extreme core points; max-payoff vectors;
Other versions of this item:
- Josep Izquierdo & Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels, 2007. "A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 17-26, September.
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Open Access publications from Tilburg University
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Working Papers in Economics
239, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles, 2009. "A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 598-610, November.
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