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Tournament Incentives, League Policy, and NBA Team Performance Revisited


Author Info

  • Joseph Price

    (Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA)

  • Brian P. Soebbing

    (University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada)

  • David Berri

    (Southern Utah University, Cedar City, UT, USA)

  • Brad R. Humphreys

    (University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada)


Taylor and Trogdon found evidence of shirking under some, but not all, draft lottery systems used in three different National Basketball Association (NBA) seasons. The authors use data from all NBA games played from 1977 to 2007 and a fixed effects model to control for unobservable team and season heterogeneity to extend this research. The authors find that NBA teams were more likely to intentionally lose games at the end of the regular season during the seasons where the incentives to finish last were the largest.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by in its journal Journal of Sports Economics.

Volume (Year): 11 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 117-135

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Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:11:y:2010:i:2:p:117-135

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Related research

Keywords: tanking; NBA; tournament theory;


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Cited by:
  1. David Berri & Stacey Brook & Aju Fenn, 2011. "From college to the pros: predicting the NBA amateur player draft," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 25-35, February.
  2. Feddersen, Arne & Humphreys, Brad & Soebbing, Brian, 2012. "Cost Incentives in European Football," Working Papers 2012-13, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.


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