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Tournament incentives and performance: Evidence from the WNBA

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  • Brian Hill

Abstract

Players entering the Women's National Basketball Association (WNBA) are allocated to teams based on a draft where lower performing teams in the regular season earn the highest odds of selecting the best players, creating an incentive for teams to lose games. Using data from the 2000–2019 seasons, results indicate that WNBA teams are more likely to lose after they have been eliminated from postseason playoffs regardless of the gender of the coach or general manager. Evidence of tanking is concentrated in seasons after the WNBA made a draft lottery change in 2015, which was intended to reduce tanking.

Suggested Citation

  • Brian Hill, 2021. "Tournament incentives and performance: Evidence from the WNBA," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 882-900, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:39:y:2021:i:4:p:882-900
    DOI: 10.1111/coep.12530
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Jepsen, 2023. "Determinants of Career Exits and Career Breaks in Women's Professional Basketball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 24(8), pages 1055-1075, December.

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