Cost Incentives in European Football
AbstractWe examine the effects of financial incentives on effort supplied by football clubs in European domestic leagues. Tournament theory predicts that the amount of effort supplied varies with returns to effort. We analyze variation in 31,746 domestic league match outcomes in ten European leagues over eleven seasons, exploiting the actual standings on the league table to generate variables reflecting incentives to provide effort in each match. Results from ordered logit regressions indicate that the effort implied by observed match outcomes support the predictions of tournament theory in this setting; clubs supply more or less effort in response to changes in incentives.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Alberta, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2012-13.
Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2012
Date of revision:
effort supply; football; UEFA Champions League;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-EUR-2012-07-14 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-HRM-2012-07-14 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-SPO-2012-07-14 (Sports & Economics)
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