Parsons, Christopher A. () (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) Sulaeman, Johan () (Southern Methodist University) Yates, Michael C. () (Auburn University) Hamermesh, Daniel S. () (University of Texas at Austin)
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We explore how umpires' racial/ethnic preferences are expressed in their evaluation of Major League Baseball pitchers. Controlling for umpire, pitcher, batter and catcher fixed effects and many other factors, strikes are more likely to be called if the umpire and pitcher match race/ethnicity. This effect only exists where there is little scrutiny of umpires' behavior – in ballparks without computerized systems monitoring umpires' calls, at poorly attended games, and when the called pitch cannot determine the outcome of the at-bat. If a pitcher shares the home-plate umpire's race/ethnicity, he gives up fewer hits, strikes out more batters, and improves his team's chance of winning. The general implication is that standard measures of salary discrimination that adjust for measured productivity may be flawed. We derive the magnitude of the bias generally and apply it to several examples.
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
3899.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Luis Garicano & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Canice Prendergast, 2001.
"Favoritism Under Social Pressure,"
Working Papers
2001-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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