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Narcotráfico y conflicto: ¿por qué bajó el precio de la cocaína?

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  • Leonardo Raffo López

    (Universidad del Valle)

Abstract

Combining the approaches of Ortiz and Mejía et al., this paper proposes a new model of drug trafficking and conflict. In a general equilibrium framework, an explanation of the downward trend in the price of cocaine over the last two decades is developed. The model shows that the main factor causing this trend is the increase in productivity in the production of cocaine, which has counterbalanced the impact of the supply-side control policies and the decrease in the number of hectares of land planted with coca.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Raffo López, 2010. "Narcotráfico y conflicto: ¿por qué bajó el precio de la cocaína?," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 12(23), pages 229-258, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:12:y:2010:i:23:p:229-258
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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/lraffo23.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carlos Humberto Ortiz Profesor del, 2002. "Luchando infructuosamente contra la hidra: un modelo sencillo del narcotráfico," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, December.
    2. Herschel Grossman & Daniel Mejía, 2008. "The war against drug producers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-23, January.
    3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    4. Daniel Mejía & Pascual Restrepo, 2008. "The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: An Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia," Documentos CEDE 005123, Universidad de los Andes - CEDE.
    5. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy & Michael Grossman, 2004. "The Economic Theory of Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs," NBER Working Papers 10976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy & Michael Grossman, 2006. "El mercado de bienes ilegales: el caso de la droga," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 8(15), pages 17-42, July-Dece.
    7. Daniel Mejía & Carlos Esteban Posada, 2007. "Cocaine Production and Trafficking: What do we know?," Borradores de Economia 444, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    8. Suren Basov & Mireille Jacobson & Jeffrey A. Miron, 2001. "Prohibition and the Market for Illegal Drugs," World Economics, World Economics, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 2(4), pages 133-157, October.
    9. Ana María Ibánez & Carlos Eduardo Vélez, 2003. "Instrumentos De Atención De La Población Desplazada En Colombia: Una Distribución Desigual De Las Responsabilidades Municipales," Documentos CEDE 2892, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    10. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1997. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(253), pages 101-117, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Leonardo Raffo López & José Luis Segura, 2015. "Las redes del narcotráfico y sus interacciones: un modelo teórico," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 17(32), pages 183-212, January-J.
    2. Leonardo Raffo López & José Luis Segura, 2018. "La ineficacia de las políticas de represión a la oferta de drogas: una explicación alternativa," Ensayos de Economía 16782, Universidad Nacional de Colombia Sede Medellín.
    3. Leonardo Raffo López, 2015. "Law enforcement and drug trafficking networks: a simple model," Documentos de Trabajo 13014, Universidad del Valle, CIDSE.
    4. Miguel Serrano López, 2020. "Violencia y corrupción como estrategias de maximización en mercados ilegales: el caso de la coca," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, vol. 39(81), pages 949-974, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    illegal markets; drug trafficking; economic theory of contests; illegal armed groups;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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