Managerial Delegation and Merger Incentives with Asymmetric Costs
AbstractWe analyse how the internal organisation of firms affects the correspondence between private and social incentives for horizontal merger. Applying a model of endogenous merger formation in a three-firm asymmetric Cournot industry, we contrast the cases of entrepreneurial and managerial firms. The use of strategic delegation increases both the probability that a merger takes place and the likelihood that the wrong type of merger, from the viewpoint of social welfare, is undertaken. This suggests that managerial delegation increases the scope for antitrust policy.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 162 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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- Kohei Kamaga & Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2007. "The Core and Productivity-Improving Mergers in Mixed Oligopoly," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 6(3), pages 181-198, December.
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- Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2011. "Strategic managerial delegation and cross-border mergers," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 49-89, September.
- Banal-Estanol, Albert & Macho-Stadler, Ines & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2008. "Endogenous mergers and endogenous efficiency gains: The efficiency defence revisited," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 69-91, January.
- Nakamura, Yasuhiko, 2011. "Bargaining over managerial delegation contracts and merger incentives in an international oligopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 47-61, March.
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